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DIGNITY AND SOCIAL MEANING:
OBERGEFELL, WINDSOR, AND LAWRENCE
AS CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE
Steve Sanders*
The U.S. Supreme Court’s three most important gay and lesbian rights
decisions—Obergefell v. Hodges, United States v. Windsor, and Lawrence
v. Texas—are united by the principle that gays and lesbians are entitled to
dignity. Beyond their tangible consequences, the common constitutional evil
of state bans on same-sex marriage, the federal Defense of Marriage Act,
and sodomy laws was that they imposed dignitary harm.
This Article explores how the gay and lesbian dignity cases exemplify the
process by which constitutional law emerges from a social and cultural
dialogue in which the Supreme Court actively participates. In doing so, it
draws on the scholarly literatures on dialogic judicial review and the role of
social meaning in constitutional law. It illuminates how the Supreme Court
interprets democratic preferences and constructs social meaning in order to
apply fundamental constitutional norms to emerging legal claims.
Contrary to the speculations of some commentators, “dignity” in these
cases did not operate as some new form of constitutional right. Rather, the
identification and protection of dignitary interests served as the unifying
principle for a process, unfolding in three cases over thirteen years, through
which constitutional law was brought into alignment with evolving public
attitudes and policy preferences. The dignity decisions should be understood
as majoritarian, not as acts of judicial will. They were broadly accepted
because the Court’s insights about the status of gays and lesbians in
American society were consistent with dramatic and long-term changes in
cultural and public attitudes. As culture and attitudes evolved, so did the
social meaning of anti-gay laws. Sodomy laws and marriage restrictions,
once accepted as presumptively constitutional protections of tradition and
public morality, increasingly came to be understood as impositions of stigma
and humiliation—the kind of expressive harms that the U.S. Constitution
forbids.
* Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law, Bloomington, IN.
My thanks for helpful suggestions on this project as it evolved from participants in workshops
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INTRODUCTION
In three cases decided over thirteen years, each dealing with a different
legal question, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the U.S. Constitution’s
guarantees of liberty or equal protection to protect gays and lesbians against
discrimination by the federal or state governments. Lawrence v. Texas1
struck down sodomy laws in 2003. Ten years later in 2013, United States v.
Windsor2 invalidated the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which
prohibited federal recognition of same-sex marriages that were legal under
state law. And in 2015, Obergefell v. Hodges3 swept aside remaining statelevel bans on same-sex marriage, which made marriage equality a reality
nationwide.
The common thread in these decisions, all written by Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy, was the centrality of the idea of “dignity.” According to the Court,
dignity attended the liberty that is inherent in making personal choices about
love and sexuality;4 the rights and public recognition that are bestowed by
states in marriage;5 and the principle of equal treatment in access to a
1. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
2. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
3. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
4. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 (“It suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose
to enter upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and
still retain their dignity as free persons.”).
5. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692 (calling the status of marriage “a far-reaching legal
acknowledgment of the intimate relationship between two people, a relationship deemed by
the State worthy of dignity in the community equal with all other marriages”).

2019]

DIGNITY AND SOCIAL MEANING

2071

fundamental right.6 And dignity was what was lost when a person could be
targeted for criminal prosecution for intimacy with another adult;7 when
one’s marriage could be disparaged by the federal government;8 and when a
legal marriage could be, in effect, summarily voided by one’s own home
state.9 The majority opinions in these cases used the word “dignity” (or the
variations “dignitary” or “indignity”) three times in Lawrence,10 ten times in
Windsor,11 and ten times in Obergefell.12
These decisions, especially Obergefell, have provoked speculation about
whether there is a new constitutional “right to dignity.” For example,
Laurence Tribe, who embraces this idea, believes that “Obergefell’s chief
jurisprudential achievement is to have tightly wound the double helix of Due
Process and Equal Protection into a doctrine of equal dignity.”13 Other
commentators have suggested how new constitutional dignity-based
arguments might apply to such controversies as transgender students’
bathroom rights,14 access to abortion,15 and a right to “nonmarriage.”16 Still
others have expressed skepticism toward dignity arguments in claims for
constitutional rights.17

6. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608 (“[Petitioners] ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the
law. The Constitution grants them that right.”).
7. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575 (noting that, at the time, sodomy in Texas was “a criminal
offense with all that imports for the dignity of the persons charged”).
8. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (“The avowed purpose and practical effect of the law here
in question are to impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all who enter
into same-sex marriages made lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States.”).
9. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2607 (observing that a home state’s refusal to recognize a
valid same-sex marriage procured in another state “inflict[s] substantial and continuing harm
on same-sex couples”).
10. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567, 574–75.
11. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2681, 2689, 2692–94, 2696.
12. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594, 2595–97, 2599, 2603, 2606, 2608.
13. Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 16, 17
(2015) [hereinafter Tribe, Equal Dignity]. Similar themes are explored in Laurence H. Tribe,
Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 1893, 1902–07 (2004) (describing the Lawrence Court’s “synthesis” of equal protection
and substantive due process).
14. Kristi L. Bowman, A Counterfactual History of Transgender Students’ Rights, 20 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. ONLINE 1, 28 (2018) (arguing that “current transgender rights cases have much
to build on in Justice Kennedy’s ‘equal dignity’ jurisprudence as they work their way through
lower federal courts”).
15. Erika Hanson, Lighting the Way Towards Liberty: The Right to Abortion After
Obergefell and Whole Woman’s Health, 45 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 93, 94 (2017) (arguing
that Obergefell “illustrates how the core principles of autonomy, dignity, and equality
strengthen all substantive due process rights, including the right to abortion”).
16. Courtney G. Joslin, The Gay Rights Canon and the Right to Nonmarriage, 97 B.U. L.
REV. 425, 433 (2017) (describing how Obergefell, including its principles of dignity and antistigma, “can strengthen, rather than foreclose, a constitutional right to nonmarriage”).
17. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, The Dangers of a Constitutional ‘Right to Dignity,’ ATLANTIC
(Apr. 29, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/the-dangerousdoctrine-of-dignity/391796/ [https://perma.cc/MJ4B-N3US] (warning that, “down the line,
the right to dignity—now celebrated by liberals for what it means to gay rights—could
ultimately produce other decisions in unrelated cases that they would not be so quick to
celebrate”).

2072

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

Scholarly commentary about these cases has addressed this idea of dignity
mostly as a matter of Fourteenth Amendment doctrine. That is, it has sought
to understand how the principle of dignity might amplify or expand existing
guarantees of equality and liberty, or whether a right to dignity can or should
serve as the basis for claims by new groups, or in new contexts, about these
constitutional rights.18
This Article builds on that work and extends it in a new direction. My
primary focus is on constitutional interpretation, not doctrine. Rather than
addressing dignity as a distinct constitutional right, this Article explores a
topic previously unaddressed in scholarly commentary:
how the
identification and protection of dignitary interests in the gay and lesbian cases
served as the unifying principle for a process, unfolding in three cases over
thirteen years, through which constitutional law was brought into alignment
with mainstream American social attitudes and policy preferences.
The gay and lesbian dignity cases, as I will refer to them, illustrate how
new constitutional law can emerge from a social and cultural dialogue in
which the Supreme Court actively participates. This trilogy of decisions
provides a case study for understanding how constitutional law can evolve in
response to developments in society and culture—specifically, how the
Constitution’s principles of equality and liberty were interpreted to
encompass new legal claims that had come to enjoy widespread public
support, even though the claims once would have been considered
unthinkable.19
In exploring the role of dignity in Lawrence, Windsor, and Obergefell, this
Article draws on two avenues of scholarship: one that explores how
constitutional law takes cognizance of the social meaning of government
laws and practices;20 the other that explains judicial review and constitutional
interpretation as a dialogic process, one that is shaped not only by precedent
and doctrine, but also by the arguments of social movements, the views of
other nonjudicial actors, and ultimately (to borrow Barry Friedman’s
phrase21), the “will of the people.”22 Reva B. Siegel has argued that these
“pathways of responsiveness” among citizens and those who interpret the

18. See, e.g., Elizabeth B. Cooper, The Power of Dignity, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 3, 20
(2015) (“It is possible that Obergefell and its dignity (anti-humiliation) approach to justice
may have lasting power, not just for gay men and lesbians, but also more broadly. Indeed, if
courts are inclined to recognize liberty-associated dignity concerns, it will be notably more
difficult for defendants to legally justify discrimination.”).
19. Barry Friedman, The Will of the People and the Process of Constitutional Change,
78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1232, 1248–49 (2010) (observing that when “[c]ircumstances and the
evolving views of the American people” come to sympathize with a group’s constitutional
claims, “courts ultimately will ratify those understandings” and “the implausible becomes
plausible”).
20. See infra Part IV.
21. See generally BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009).
22. See infra Part III.
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Constitution are “crucial to securing the Constitution’s democratic
authority.”23
When it invoked the idea of dignity in these cases, the Court spoke in the
vernacular, in a way that exposed “the social meaning and the expressive
dimensions of” the anti-gay laws being challenged.24 The Court recurred to
the concept of dignity to explain how criminal sodomy laws and federal and
state marriage restrictions, once assumed by most people to be legitimate and
necessary for protecting tradition and public morality, had become repugnant
to constitutional equality and liberty because their effects, as they had come
to be understood by the larger society, were to demean and impose stigma.25
Their harms and constitutional defects “result[ed] from the ideas or attitudes
expressed” by these laws as much as or more than “the more tangible or
material consequences” they imposed.26 To say that a law imposes stigma
merely describes an effect; to say that a law offends dignity incorporates
assumptions about the group targeted by the stigma: that its members are
entitled to the same high regard that government gives to the rest of its
citizens.
The gay and lesbian dignity cases were products of constitutional dialogue
between the Court and society at large. The decisions built upon one another,
moving over the course of thirteen years from the least controversial issue
(sodomy laws) to the most controversial (marriage equality in the states).27
The decisions forthrightly embraced social change,28 and they recognized
that the social meaning of sodomy laws and marriage restrictions had
changed as Americans’ attitudes about these issues, and about the status of
gays and lesbians generally, continued to evolve.29 The decisions reflected
how questions of sexual orientation had transitioned, as Martha Nussbaum
has put it, from a “politics of disgust” to a “politics of humanity.”30
The dialogic model of judicial review posits that courts, in Friedman’s
words, “do not stand aloof from society and declare rights,” but instead “they
interact on a daily basis with society, taking part in an interpretive

23. Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional
Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1326 (2006).
24. Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms,
and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725, 726 (1998).
25. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602, 2608 (2015) (discussing that state
marriage bans “impose stigma and injury of the kind prohibited by our basic charter,” thus
denying “equal dignity in the eyes of the law”); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675,
2693 (2013) (explaining that DOMA’s purpose and effect were to impose “stigma upon all
who enter into same-sex marriages,” and such “interference with the equal dignity of samesex marriages” was its “essence”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003) (observing
that a sodomy statute imposed “stigma” as a criminal offense “with all that imports for the
dignity of the persons charged”).
26. Pildes, supra note 24, at 755.
27. See infra Part V.B.
28. See infra Part V.C.
29. See infra Part IV.C.
30. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW xix (2010).
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dialogue.”31 In this process, “[p]opular politics and Court decisions, moving
together sometimes in harmony and sometimes not, . . . shape[] the meaning
of the Constitution.”32 Contrary to the understanding of constitutional law
as a top-down enterprise conducted solely by judges, this model of judicial
review recognizes that, as Robert Post has explained, “constitutional law and
culture are locked in a dialectical relationship.”33
Some critics, including the dissenting justices, have condemned these
decisions as products of judicial hubris.34 However, to the extent that the
point of such criticism is that the Court was substituting its own judgment for
that of the people, it is mistaken.35 All of these decisions should be
understood as majoritarian, not countermajoritarian, in that the Court was
catching up with public attitudes and a constitutional culture36 where steadily
expanding numbers of Americans rejected the criminalization of gay sex and
supported marriage equality.37 A majority of Americans did not need to be
browbeaten by the Court into the conclusion that sodomy laws demeaned
same-sex relationships,38 that DOMA worked gratuitous and harmful
discrimination,39 or that state constitutional amendments banning same-sex
marriage imposed stigma40 because those conclusions about social meaning
and dignitary harm were consistent with a dramatic evolution in public
attitudes and culture toward gays and lesbians that had taken place over more
than forty years.41
Once these social meanings of sodomy laws and marriage restrictions are
understood as offenses to dignity, the holdings of Lawrence, Windsor, and
Obergefell can be understood as applications of a principle at the core of the
Fourteenth Amendment: that government may not enact laws whose primary
31. Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 585 (1993).
32. Friedman, supra note 19, at 1235.
33. Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and
Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (2003).
34. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2612 (2015) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (calling the majority decision “an act of will, not legal judgment”); Emily Buss,
The Divisive Supreme Court, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 25, 25 (describing Obergefell as being
“widely perceived as the work of a partisan elite imposing its policy preferences on the
American people” and arguing that the question should have remained longer with the lower
courts); Nelson Lund & John O. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris, 102
MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1557 (2004) (characterizing the Lawrence majority opinion as “a tissue
of sophistries embroidered with a bit of sophomoric philosophizing”).
35. See infra notes 331–33 and accompanying text.
36. For a discussion of the idea of “constitutional culture,” see infra notes 188–98 and
accompanying text.
37. A month before Lawrence was decided, 59 percent of Americans agreed that “gay or
lesbian relations between consenting adults” should be legal, up from 33 percent in 1986. Gay
and Lesbian Rights, GALLUP, http://news.gallup.com/poll/1651/rights.aspx [https://perma.cc/
6UFQ-KFYE] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019). A month before Obergefell was decided, 60
percent said same-sex marriage should be legal, up from 27 percent in 1996. Id.
38. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003).
39. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (noting that DOMA’s purpose
and effect were to impose “stigma upon all who enter into same-sex marriages”).
40. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (discussing the idea that state
marriage bans “impose stigma and injury of the kind prohibited by our basic charter”).
41. For a discussion of this history and the data on public attitudes, see infra Part II.
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effect is to demean and stigmatize.42 Because all three of these cases deploy
dignity as an anti-stigma principle, they can be harmonized with wellestablished Fourteenth Amendment values43 (or, in the case of Windsor,
analogous values applied to the federal government through the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause).44
The gay and lesbian dignity cases thus illustrate the operation of a
common-law, or “living,” Constitution—that is, a Constitution whose
fundamental principles of equality and liberty adapt and are applied to
address new claims in new contexts. As Daniel Conkle has written,
When the Supreme Court interprets the capacious language of the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses, its task is art as much as science,
judicial statesmanship as much as technical craft. The Court mediates past,
present, and future, identifying individual rights that befit the evolving
political morality of our society. By its very nature, the Fourteenth
Amendment protects minority rights from state and local majoritarian
oppression. But what rights, in particular, does the Amendment protect?
In deciding this question, the Justices rely in part on precedent and in part
on their own understandings of liberty and equality. At the same time,
however, the Court generally acts, and properly so, in a manner that tracks
the evolving values of the country as a whole.45

In Lawrence, Windsor, and Obergefell, the concept of dignity was the vehicle
the Court used to translate the nation’s “evolving political morality” about
the status of gays and lesbians into holdings of constitutional law. To say
that our political morality has evolved on matters like sodomy laws and
marriage restrictions is to say that a majority of Americans have come to
understand the social meaning of these forms of discrimination in a different
way than they previously did—as matters of dignitary harm—and that that
difference has constitutional significance.
This Article seeks to contribute to our understanding of how judicial
review works not in theory, but in practice.46 Regardless of one’s attitudes
about the appropriate methods of constitutional interpretation or the role of
42. See infra Part IV.B.
43. See infra Part IV.C.
44. Windsor was decided under “the guarantee of equal protection . . . applied to the
Federal Government through the Fifth Amendment.” Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683. This Article
will not belabor that technical point.
45. Daniel O. Conkle, Evolving Values, Animus, and Same-Sex Marriage, 89 IND. L.J. 27,
28 (2014); see also Daniel O. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L.
REV. 63, 128–33 (2006) [hereinafter, Conkle, Three Theories] (advocating a substantive due
process “theory of evolving national values”); Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court Follows
Public Opinion, in LEGAL CHANGE: LESSONS FROM AMERICA’S SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 21, 23
(Jennifer Weiss-Wolf & Jeanine Plant-Chirlin eds., 2015) (observing that “the Court usually
pays attention to an actual or emerging moral consensus, certainly with respect to fundamental
rights,” and that “[i]f most people have come to share a moral commitment, or if the arc of
history is clearly on one side, then judges are likely to pay respectful attention”).
46. See Friedman, supra note 19, at 1240 (“What scholars should not be asking is how to
justify judicial review as a counter-majoritarian institution. Instead, they should be studying
how it operates in differing circumstances, posing normative questions and suggestions for
change in light of that reality.”).

2076

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

the Supreme Court in a democratic society, the dialogic model of judicial
review provides a lens for understanding a specific yet momentous
development: the extension of equality and liberty protections to a group—
gays and lesbians—that was once despised by most of society, but that now
is associated positively with three of the most consequential decisions in
modern constitutional law.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I briefly examines human dignity
as a constitutional principle. Part II sketches the impact of the LGBT social
movement and the dramatic changes it produced in public attitudes on
specific legal questions and the status of gays and lesbians in the larger
culture. Part III develops necessary theoretical framing by explaining
dialogic judicial review—the idea that constitutional law is shaped not by
judges working in isolation, but by interaction among judicial interpretations,
public understandings, and constitutional culture.
Part IV begins by explaining how the Court’s exposition of a law’s social
meaning—that is, the expressive effect a law has acquired, whether intended
or not—often has determined the outcome of constitutional cases,
particularly in matters dealing with equality. It then argues that the trilogy
of gay and lesbian dignity cases demonstrated a Supreme Court that was in
dialogue with the society at large about the social meaning of governmentimposed discrimination against gays and lesbians. The Court appropriately
gave legal substance to this attitudinal and cultural change when it concluded
that the social meaning of sodomy laws and marriage restrictions was now
understood to be the imposition of dignitary harm—the kind of stigma and
humiliation that is repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment.
Part V considers how, in more general ways apart from their focus on
stigma and social meaning, the gay and lesbian dignity decisions manifested
constitutional dialogue: they accurately reflected majority attitudes,
contributed to a dynamic process of attitudinal change and legal innovation,
and expressly embraced social and cultural change regarding gays and
lesbians while articulating an evolving conception of constitutional
guarantees.
I. DIGNITY AS A CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE
Human dignity has been the subject of philosophical and religious thought
for some 2500 years.47 Its status as a constitutional value or constitutional
right, and more broadly as a subject of human rights discourse, is a more
modern phenomenon having emerged in the period immediately following
World War II.48
The preamble to the U.N. Charter, enacted in 1945, expresses the United
Nations’s determination to “reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in
the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and
47. AHARON BARAK, HUMAN DIGNITY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 15–16 (2015). For a bibliography of major sources about the concept
of human dignity, see id. at 15 n.1.
48. Id. at 34.
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women.”49 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, approved by the
U.N. General Assembly in 1948, says that “[a]ll human beings are born free
and equal in dignity and rights.”50 And the German Basic Law, the
constitution of postwar Germany, which took effect in 1949, declares,
“Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the
duty of all state authority.”51
In the latter half of the twentieth century, dignity became a central concern
of constitution writers, constitutional lawyers and scholars, and the
international human rights community.52 It is a cornerstone of several
modern constitutions, where it is expressly guaranteed as a right.53 Yet, the
“precise definition” of constitutional dignity remains “elusive.”54 Professor
Neomi Rao has observed that “the value of human dignity comes in part from
its evolving and plastic nature—its appeal, as well as its difficulties, lies in
its amorphous content.”55
In the United States, the term “dignity” does not appear in the text of the
Constitution, and the Supreme Court has never sought to define or recognize
it as a right to which specific claims can be made.56 Nor have the “content
and scope of the social and constitutional value of human dignity . . . been
sufficiently clarified” by the Supreme Court or “reached the level of
importance that would allow it to be recognized as a constitutional right
derived from one of the existing constitutional rights.”57
Still, references to human or individual dignity as an ideal or value have
appeared in many Supreme Court opinions, beginning in the 1940s “in
dissenting opinions arguing for a more robust conception of individual
liberties,”58 and “[s]ince that time, the Supreme Court has increasingly relied
on concepts of personal and human dignity to explain, develop, and broaden
various constitutional protections.”59 By and large, the Court has “treated
human dignity as a value underlying, or giving meaning to, existing

49. U.N. Charter art. 16.
50. G.A. Res. 217 (III), at 72 (Dec. 10, 1948).
51. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] art. I, § 1 (Ger.), translation at http://www.gesetzeim-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#p0022 [https://perma.cc/6K7P-RTRR].
52. See generally MICHAEL ROSEN, DIGNITY: ITS HISTORY AND MEANING (2012).
53. BARAK, supra note 47, at 139 (listing the constitutions of Germany, Colombia, Israel,
Russia, South Africa, Poland, and Switzerland).
54. Neomi Rao, On the Use and Abuse of Dignity in Constitutional Law, 14 COLUM. J.
EUR. L. 201, 205 (2008).
55. Id. Rao suggests that the use of the term “dignity” by constitutional courts around the
world can be categorized around three general “concepts”: the “inherent worth of each
individual”; as grounds for enforcing various substantive values which “promote the public
good and improve the lives of individuals”; and as a form of “recognition” which “requires
esteem and respect for the particularity of each individual” and “creates a political demand for
the state and other individuals to accept and approve of one’s lifestyle and personal choices.”
Neomi Rao, Three Concepts of Dignity in Constitutional Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 183,
187, 222, 243 (2011).
56. Rao, supra note 54, at 202.
57. BARAK, supra note 47, at 188.
58. Rao, supra note 54, at 202 (footnote omitted).
59. Id. (footnote omitted).
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constitutional rights and guarantees.”60 By one count published in 2011—
before Windsor or Obergefell—the justices had used the word “dignity” in
more than nine hundred opinions.61
Dignity has been discussed in majority or dissenting opinions as a value
underlying claims arising under the First Amendment right to free speech,62
the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures,63 the Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination,64
the Eighth Amendment’s guarantee against cruel and unusual punishments,65
and various lines of doctrine under the Fourteenth Amendment, including the
right to privacy,66 the ability to choose the timing and circumstances of one’s
own death when death is imminent,67 and equal protection against racial
discrimination in education and access to accommodations.68 Indeed, the
point that racial discrimination is incompatible with the dignity of a citizen
in a free society continues to be a core theme of the Court’s contemporary
equal protection cases addressing race and ethnicity.69 In the area of
substantive due process, cases like Lawrence and Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey70 have emphasized the relationship
between dignity and the liberty and autonomy principles of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.71 These cases capture an understanding of dignity
roughly akin to what the comparative constitutional scholar and former
Israeli Supreme Court jurist Aharon Barak has called the “freedom to write
[one’s own] life story.”72 Dissenting in Bowers v. Hardwick,73 which upheld
sodomy laws but was later overruled by Lawrence,74 Justice John Paul
Stevens invoked “our tradition of respect for the dignity of individual choice
in matters of conscience”—the first use of the term “dignity” in a Supreme

60. Maxine D. Goodman, Human Dignity in Supreme Court Constitutional
Jurisprudence, 84 NEB. L. REV. 740, 743 (2006).
61. Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169, 178–79
(2011).
62. See Goodman, supra note 60, at 786–89.
63. Id. at 767–72.
64. Id. at 765–67.
65. Id. at 772–78.
66. Id. at 759–62.
67. Id. at 779–83.
68. Id. at 762–65.
69. See, e.g., Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000) (“One of the principal reasons
race is treated as a forbidden classification is that it demeans the dignity and worth of a person
to be judged by ancestry instead of by his or her own merit and essential qualities.”).
70. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
71. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (holding that “intimate and personal
choices . . . central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment” (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851)).
72. BARAK, supra note 47, at 144; see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 746–
47 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring) (observing that allowing a terminally ill person, rather than
the state, to make decisions about her quality of life “gives proper recognition to the
individual’s interest in choosing a final chapter that accords with her life story”).
73. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
74. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
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Court opinion dealing with gay and lesbian rights.75 Even before the full trio
of gay and lesbian dignity cases had been decided, scholars such as Reva B.
Siegel were exploring the meaning of dignity for Fourteenth Amendment
rights and liberties such as reproductive choice.76
The gay and lesbian dignity cases, especially Obergefell, have prompted
scholarly commentary seeking to understand the significance of the Court’s
use of dignity and whether it carries enduring meaning for equality or
substantive due process jurisprudence. For example, Laurence Tribe argues
that “Obergefell’s chief jurisprudential achievement is to have tightly wound
the double helix of Due Process and Equal Protection into the equal dignity
doctrine.”77 This doctrine of equal dignity, Tribe says, is “the rubric under
which fundamental rights should be evaluated going forward.”78 Tribe
believes that Obergefell’s full meaning has yet to be realized: “Equal dignity,
a concept with a robust doctrinal pedigree, does not simply look back to
purposeful past subordination, but rather lays the groundwork for an ongoing
constitutional dialogue about fundamental rights and the meaning of
equality.”79
A common thread in the post-Obergefell scholarship is the explanation of
dignity’s potential for advancing the rights of marginalized groups, including
but not limited to gays and lesbians, and combatting discrimination. For
example, Elizabeth B. Cooper suggests that Obergefell “reflects an
acceptance of and respect for gay men and lesbians that,” even beyond the
question of marriage, “will profoundly change not only how the law treats
LGBT individuals, but also how we are treated by others, as well as how we
perceive ourselves.”80 Obergefell’s “dignity (and anti-humiliation) approach
to justice may have lasting power,” she says, “not just for gay men and
lesbians, but also more broadly” as courts “recognize liberty-associated
dignity concerns” and thus make it “notably more difficult for defendants to
legally justify discrimination.”81 Luke A. Boso proposes that “equal dignity
is one theory of Equal Protection that can explain when governmental
stereotyping is unconstitutional” and that Obergefell unifies themes in the
Court’s Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence of “anti-group subordination”
and individual liberty.82 Commentators have speculated about how dignitybased arguments stemming from the gay and lesbian rights cases might apply
to such controversies as transgender students’ bathroom rights, access to
abortion, and a right to “nonmarriage.”83 In addition, one commentator has
75. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 217 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Fitzgerald v. Porter Mem’l
Hosp., 523 F.2d 716, 719–20 (7th Cir. 1975)).
76. See generally Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion
Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694 (2008).
77. Tribe, Equal Dignity, supra note 13, at 17.
78. Id. at 20.
79. Id. at 17.
80. Cooper, supra note 18, at 5.
81. Id. at 20.
82. Luke A. Boso, Dignity, Inequality, and Stereotypes, 92 WASH L. REV. 1119, 1122
(2017).
83. See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text.
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suggested that the Supreme Court should rely on Obergefell’s references to
human dignity to support a new fundamental right to food security.84
Not all commentators agree upon the future ramifications of the Court’s
use of dignity. Kenji Yoshino believes that, whereas cases such as Lawrence,
Casey, and Windsor relied heavily on the notion of dignity, Obergefell gives
more emphasis to liberty.85
Jeffrey Rosen has warned that
“constitutionalizing” the “injury” of same-sex marriage bans “with broad
abstractions like dignity may lead to results in the future that liberals come
to regret” because dignitary harm could be claimed by litigants challenging
such things as gun regulations, smoking bans, or nondiscrimination laws that
some conservative Christians see as violating their religious liberty.86 Yuvraj
Joshi criticizes Obergefell for shifting the constitutional meaning of dignity
away from respect for intimate choices and the kind of personal autonomy
that was extolled in Casey to a more conservative meaning, the
“respectability of choices and choice makers.”87
Dignity holds the potential to shape new constitutional doctrine, but how
exactly that might happen remains largely undeveloped. The Court has
continued to invoke dignity in constitutional cases: in a 2017 Sixth
Amendment decision about juror racial bias, Justice Kennedy went so far as
to declare broadly that the nation has a “commitment to the equal dignity of
all persons.”88 But, the Court has yet to give any true independent substance
to constitutional dignity. It has not engaged in the sort of synthesizing,
clarifying analysis—historical, doctrinal, or comparative—that would be
necessary to make dignity a distinct constitutional right in the conventional
sense. And Justice Kennedy’s retirement from the Court likely will result in
fewer opinions in which dignity is a prominent theme.
As the remainder of this Article explains, dignity in Obergefell, Windsor,
and Lawrence is best understood not as a new doctrine, but as a framework
for understanding one particular set of developments. It is a principle which
unites three cases in which the Court articulated the social meaning of antigay government discrimination and translated the nation’s “evolving political
morality” about the status of gays and lesbians into protections afforded by
constitutional law against governmental discrimination.

84. See generally Maxine D. Goodman, The Obergefell Marriage Equality Decision, with
Its Emphasis on Human Dignity, and a Fundamental Right to Food Security, 13 HASTINGS
RACE & POVERTY L.J. 149 (2016).
85. Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV.
147, 170 (2015).
86. Rosen, supra note 17.
87. Yuvraj Joshi, The Respectable Dignity of Obergefell v. Hodges, 6 CALIF. L. REV.
CIRCUIT 117, 117 (2015). On this reading, “[t]he ‘dignity’ that Obergefell invokes expects
same-sex couples to make choices regarding their relationships that are the same as the
dominant culture.” Id. at 122.
88. Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 867 (2017) (holding that where a juror
makes a clear statement that indicates he or she relied on racial prejudice to convict a criminal
defendant, the Sixth Amendment requires that the no-impeachment rule give way to permit
the trial court to consider the evidence and impact of the juror’s statement).

2019]

DIGNITY AND SOCIAL MEANING

2081

II. “FROM OUTLAWS TO IN-LAWS”: THE REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN
ATTITUDES TOWARD GAYS AND LESBIANS
Writing in 1967 amid a political and cultural climate in which police could
harass, persecute, and humiliate homosexuals with impunity, an editorial
writer for the then-new magazine Los Angeles Advocate89 wrote, “We do not
ask for our rights on bended knee. We demand them, standing tall, as
dignified human beings. We will not go away.”90 Writing in 1999—before
Lawrence, before it was legal for gays and lesbians to marry in any state, and
while political backlash against the same-sex marriage movement was still
reaching its height—journalists Dudley Clendinen and Adam Nagourney
nonetheless wrote that “the movement for gay identity and gay rights has
come further and faster, in terms of change, than any other that has gone
before it in this nation.”91
In 2012, the year before Windsor and three years before Obergefell, social
commentator E. J. Graff marveled,
Fifty years ago, being gay put you beyond the social pale. You could be
savagely beaten, kicked out of public spaces and private clubs, arrested,
fired, expelled from your family, and scorned as a pariah. Today, lesbians
and gay men are all but equal, with full marriage rights in view—supported
by President Barack Obama in action and words. How did we win so much
so fast?92

The dramatic changes in public attitudes and American culture that paved
the way to Lawrence, Windsor, and Obergefell did not arise organically.
They were the products of a half century of social-movement activism, public
and private discourses, legal reform, legislative and political campaigns, and
court decisions.93 Writing a few days after the Obergefell decision, journalist
Molly Ball observed, “What changed . . . wasn’t the Constitution—it was the
country. And what changed the country was a movement.”94 The Court’s
decision “wasn’t solely or even primarily the work of the lawyers and
plaintiffs who brought the case. It was the product of the decades of activism
89. Today, this national publication is known simply as the Advocate.
90. Editorial, Harassment? Hell No!, L.A. ADVOCATE, Oct. 1967, at 6.
91. DUDLEY CLENDINEN & ADAM NAGOURNEY, OUT FOR GOOD: THE STRUGGLE TO BUILD
A GAY RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 13 (1999).
92. E. J. Graff, How the Gay-Rights Movement Won, AM. PROSPECT (June 7, 2012),
http://prospect.org/article/how-gay-rights-movement-won [https://perma.cc/Z9ND-5CER].
93. For in-depth treatments of the history of the gay and lesbian movement and the more
recent movement for marriage equality, see generally JO BECKER, FORCING THE SPRING:
INSIDE THE FIGHT FOR MARRIAGE EQUALITY (2014); CLENDINEN & NAGOURNEY, supra note
91; LINDA HIRSHMAN, VICTORY: THE TRIUMPHANT GAY REVOLUTION—HOW A DESPISED
MINORITY PUSHED BACK, BEAT DEATH, FOUND LOVE, AND CHANGED AMERICA FOR EVERYONE
(2014); SUZANNA DANUTA WALTERS, ALL THE RAGE: THE STORY OF GAY VISIBILITY IN
AMERICA (2001); LONG ROAD TO FREEDOM: THE ADVOCATE HISTORY OF THE GAY AND
LESBIAN MOVEMENT (Mark Thompson ed., 1994); THE NEW YORK TIMES TWENTIETH
CENTURY IN REVIEW: THE GAY RIGHTS MOVEMENT (Vincent J. Samar ed., 2001); and Molly
Ball, How Gay Marriage Became a Constitutional Right, ATLANTIC (July 1, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/07/gay-marriage-supreme-court-politicsactivism/397052/ [https://perma.cc/KWS8-J7U7].
94. Ball, supra note 93.
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that made the idea of gay marriage seem plausible, desirable, and right.”95
As a result of these processes, the idea that gays and lesbians deserved the
same legal rights and social status as everyone else slowly, with occasional
setbacks, but inexorably, became the mainstream view. This evolution in
attitudes made the Court’s dignity decisions possible.
Beginning in the late 1980s and early 1990s, American attitudes toward
homosexuality, and toward gays and lesbians as people, began to change both
markedly and rapidly. As the pace accelerated over the next two decades,
pollsters and scholars of public opinion would describe the changes as
“unprecedented”96 and a “sea change.”97 The change on the question of
marriage equality was especially profound. As two political scientists have
commented, the rate of attitudinal change about same-sex marriage was
“simply stunning and defies typical patterns of public opinion.”98 One
conservative commentator summed up the phenomenon this way: “The gay
rights movement has made enormous strides over the past few decades, and
the recent surge in public support for the once unthinkable concept of samesex marriage reflects this quite radical shift in American culture.”99
In 2000, three years before Lawrence, political scientists Kenneth Sherrill
and Alan Yang documented changes in public attitudes toward gays and
lesbians in an article aptly titled “From Outlaws to In-Laws: Anti-Gay
Attitudes Thaw.”100 The article highlighted positive trends in attitudes
toward gays and lesbians as expressed through such measures as the “feeling
thermometer” used by National Election Studies, support for employment
nondiscrimination laws, and support for hate crimes laws.101 Sherrill and
Yang found it especially significant that a large majority—76 percent—
supported a federal law to increase the penalty for bias-motivated crimes
against gays and lesbians. “This statistic,” they wrote, “suggests that the
lesbian and gay movement has at least partially succeeded in transforming
lesbians and gays into an intelligibly recognized minority group.”102

95. Id.
96. Chris Cillizza, How Unbelievably Quickly Public Opinion Changed on Gay Marriage,
in 5 Charts, WASH. POST (June 26, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thefix/wp/2015/06/26/how-unbelievably-quickly-public-opinion-changed-on-gay-marriage-in6-charts/ [https://perma.cc/NSD8-HJY2].
97. Shankar Vedantam, Shift in Gay Marriage Support Mirrors a Changing America,
NPR (Mar. 25, 2013, 3:14 AM), https://www.npr.org/2013/03/25/174989702/shift-in-gaymarriage-support-mirrors-a-changing-america [https://perma.cc/5USV-4BS3].
98. BRIAN F. HARRISON & MELISSA R. MICHELSON, LISTEN, WE NEED TO TALK: HOW TO
CHANGE ATTITUDES ABOUT LGBT RIGHTS 1 (2017).
99. David Lampo, Why Gay Rights Are Civil Rights—and Simply Right, AM.
CONSERVATIVE (July 8, 2013), http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/why-gayrights-are-civil-rights-and-simply-right/ [https://perma.cc/EV4F-DTAA].
100. Kenneth Sherrill & Alan Yang, From Outlaws to In-Laws: Anti-Gay Attitudes Thaw,
11 PUB. PERSP. 20, 20–23 (2000).
101. Id. at 21, 23.
102. Id. at 23.
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Even if Americans were not ready to see marriage equality extended to
gays and lesbians,103 by the early 2000s public attitudes were moving
steadily in a direction that was increasingly difficult to reconcile with the
purpose of sodomy laws: to express moral disapproval of gays and lesbians
by making their sexual activity a crime. It is instructive, then, to look at what
was happening outside the Court in the years before Lawrence.
In November 1985, a few months before the Court upheld sodomy laws in
Bowers v. Hardwick,104 44 percent of Americans said they thought “gay or
lesbian relations between consenting adults should . . . be legal,” while
47 percent thought they should not be.105 But by the time Lawrence was
decided in 2003, the official moral condemnation that was the purpose of
sodomy laws had become inconsistent with Americans’ evolving attitudes
toward gays and lesbians.
First, support had rapidly declined for criminalizing gay sex. In early May
2003 (a few weeks before Lawrence was announced), the number of
Americans agreeing that gay sex should be legal had reached a high of
60 percent, with only 35 percent saying it should be illegal.106 The last time
a plurality of Americans had said gay and lesbian relations should be illegal
was 1996, and the last time a majority had registered that view was 1988.107
Beyond sodomy laws, attitudes about gays and lesbians more generally
also were evolving. The same Gallup poll in May 2003 showed that
54 percent agreed that “homosexuality should be considered an acceptable
alternative lifestyle,” up from 34 percent in 1982.108 Increasing numbers of
Americans said that they thought “being gay or lesbian” was “something a
person is born with.”109 Eighty-eight percent agreed that “homosexuals
should . . . have equal rights in terms of job opportunities.”110 Seventy-nine
percent would accept a gay or lesbian person as a member of the president’s
cabinet (up from 54 percent in 1992), and 61 percent would accept them as
an elementary school teacher (up from 41 percent in 1992).111
103. Id. at 22–23 (observing that “[i]nclusion and equality in . . . marriage and the
family . . . might be seen as different in kind when compared to inclusion and equality in the
polity or sectors of the economy,” and that forces including “centuries of moral
disapprobation” and “natural-law based assumptions of legitimate family and relational
arrangements” worked “in tandem with existing social, political and economic arrangements
that reproduce heterosexuality (and heterosexual family forms), to reinforce existing ideas
about what constitutes a legitimate marriage and family” (emphasis added)).
104. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
105. Gay and Lesbian Rights, supra note 37.
106. Id.; see also ANDREW R. FLORES, WILLIAMS INST., NATIONAL TRENDS IN PUBLIC
OPINION
ON
LGBT
RIGHTS
IN
THE
UNITED
STATES
18
(2014),
https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/POP-natl-trends-nov-2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EU3Y-XVUK] (observing that “[s]upport for sodomy laws decreased
throughout the 1990s, and the public entered the 2000s with a strong majority supportive of
legalizing same-sex sexual relations”).
107. Gay and Lesbian Rights, supra note 37.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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Evolving public attitudes supported legal reform in the states. The Model
Penal Code had taken the view since 1955—almost a half century before
Lawrence—that states should not provide for “criminal penalties for
consensual sexual relations conducted in private.”112 Although sodomy laws
were once widespread—all fifty states had them until 1961, when Illinois
repealed its sodomy statute113—by the time of Lawrence all but thirteen
states had eliminated them through legislative reform or state judicial
decision,114 and only four applied them exclusively to gay sex.115 By 1998,
the year that John Lawrence and Tyrone Garner were arrested in Lawrence’s
Houston home, sodomy laws had become essentially relics that were
“arbitrarily enforced”116 and, as a practical matter, had fallen into
desuetude.117 Even when sodomy laws were more common, they typically
were not “enforced against consenting adults acting in private.”118 Even as
Texas defended its sodomy law by telling the Court that the “prohibition of
homosexual conduct . . . represents the reasoned judgment of the Texas
Legislature that such conduct is immoral and should be deterred,”119 it
admitted that “the statute is unlikely to deter many individuals with an
exclusively homosexual orientation.”120
A month after Lawrence, Gallup found that 32 percent of Americans said
that their “attitudes toward gays and lesbians” had “become . . . more
accepting” over the “past few years,” compared with only 8 percent who said
they had become less accepting.121 And more than half of respondents—
56 percent—said they had friends, relatives, or coworkers who had come out
to them as gay or lesbian, more than twice the number in 1985.122
Americans were becoming personally more familiar with gays and
lesbians because large numbers of them were coming out each year. The
rising visibility of gays and lesbians in daily life was arguably the single
greatest factor in the rapid transformation of American society and culture
toward opposition to sodomy laws and support for marriage equality. As
political scientist Jeremiah J. Garretson has written, “it is this increased
112. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 cmt., at 372 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
113. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003).
114. Id. at 573.
115. See id.
116. Id. at 572.
117. See State v. Morales, 869 S.W.2d 941, 943 (Tex. 1994) (observing that the Texas
sodomy law “has not been, and in all probability will not be, enforced against private
consensual conduct between adults”).
118. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 569. The Court discussed legal treatises and scholarship
indicating that sodomy prosecutions often involved sex with minors (of either sex) or other
persons who were legally incapable of providing consent, and the “infrequency” of
prosecutions made it “difficult to say that society approved of a rigorous and systematic
punishment of the consensual acts committed in private and by adults.” Id. at 569–70.
119. Respondent’s Brief, Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 470184, at *48.
120. Id. at *48 n.31. The state speculated that the law might still be “effective to some
degree in deterring the remaining population (i.e., persons with a heterosexual or bisexual
orientation) from detrimentally experimenting in homosexual conduct.” Id.
121. Gay and Lesbian Rights, supra note 37.
122. Id.
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exposure—in the form of interpersonal and mediated contact with lesbians
and gays—that has largely defined the most prominent features of opinion
change on gay issues: its broadness, its durability, its rapidity, and its
concentration among the millennial generation.”123 When the Pew Research
Center asked Americans in 2013 what had caused them to change their minds
in support of same-sex marriage, the largest single answer was that they
“know someone . . . who is homosexual.”124 All this suggests that these
attitudinal changes were not simply shifts in abstract political preferences,
but were driven by an appreciation for the dignity of gays and lesbians as
people and by an appreciation for the dignitary harms that anti-gay laws
imposed on gay family members, friends, neighbors, or coworkers.
To be sure, the advancements being made by gays and lesbians generated
political resistance. No state expressly defined marriage as a union between
a man and a woman before Maryland did so in 1973 “in an apparent response
to attempts by same-sex couples to obtain marriage licenses.”125 Two
decades later, in 1993, a decision of the Hawaii Supreme Court in Baehr v.
Lewin126 looked as though it might make Hawaii the first state to allow legal
same-sex marriage. Same-sex marriage ultimately was not legalized in
Hawaii due to a constitutional amendment approved by the state’s voters.127
Baehr set off a rapid series of “backlash measures” that became a “mainstay
of the [same-sex marriage] controversy.”128 In 1996, Congress enacted
DOMA, which, according to its lead sponsor, was “designed to thwart the
then-nascent move in a few state courts and legislatures to afford partial or
full recognition to same-sex couples.”129 DOMA’s legislative history was
characterized by blunt anti-gay bigotry of a kind that would be nearly
impossible to imagine coming from any legislative body today.130 States also
123. JEREMIAH J. GARRETSON, THE PATH TO GAY RIGHTS: HOW ACTIVISM AND COMING
OUT CHANGED PUBLIC OPINION 7 (2018); see also HARRISON & MICHELSON, supra note 98,
at 2 (positing that “the rapid change in opinion on marriage equality occurred because over
time, individuals were nudged by members and leaders of their social groups to reconsider
their existing opinions”).
124. Growing Support for Gay Marriage: Changed Minds and Changing Demographics,
PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 20, 2013) [hereinafter Growing Support for Gay Marriage],
http://www.people-press.org/2013/03/20/growing-support-for-gay-marriage-changed-mindsand-changing-demographics/ [https://perma.cc/7ELX-LBLM].
125. Kevin Rector, Md. Attorney General Says Supreme Court Must Overturn Same-Sex
Marriage
Bans
Nationwide,
BALT. SUN
(Mar. 9,
2015,
4:00
PM),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/features/gay-in-maryland/gay-matters/bs-gm-attorneygeneral-issues-report-calling-samesex-marriage-bans-20150309-story.html [https://perma.cc/
M9WP-GT64] (quoting Maryland Attorney General Brian E. Frosh).
126. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
127. WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND
THE LAW 612 (3d ed. 2008).
128. Jane S. Schacter, Courts and the Politics of Backlash: Marriage Equality Litigation,
Then and Now, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1153, 1154 (2009).
129. Bob Barr, No Defending the Defense of Marriage Act, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2009, 12:00
AM), http://www.latimes.com/la-oe-barr5-2009jan05-story.html [https://perma.cc/4A5XRT6C].
130. DOMA’s stated official purposes were “rife with unconcealed animus.” Steve
Sanders, Making It Up: Lessons for Equal Protection Doctrine from the Use and Abuse of
Hypothesized Purposes in the Marriage Equality Litigation, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 657, 700
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began approving statutes, constitutional amendments, or both banning samesex marriage (commonly referred to as “mini-DOMAs”).131 The antimarriage-equality movement intensified after the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court in 2003 made that state the first to legalize same-sex
marriage.132 By 2012, some forty states banned same-sex marriage, thirtyone of these by state constitutional amendment.133
In retrospect, these measures must be understood as products of an intense
but transitory period of backlash and adaptation.134 The measures were
sponsored and promoted by religious-conservative activists and Republican
politicians who exploited public uncertainty about the meaning and
implications of same-sex marriage coupled with greater rights and visibility
for gays and lesbians. At the time, some saw these measures as serious
setbacks for the cause of marriage equality.135 Yet remarkably, even after
the enactment of the federal DOMA and throughout the era of the miniDOMAs, national public support for same-sex marriage continued its steady,
long-term upward trend.136
During the ten years between Lawrence and Windsor, trends in public
attitudes toward gays and lesbians continued in this positive direction. A
study published by the Russell Sage Foundation found that in 2010,
(2017). The House committee report setting forth the rationales for DOMA portrayed the
then-emergent movement for legal same-sex marriage as a dangerous and radical threat from
which traditional heterosexual marriage needed to be defended. H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 2–
16 (1996). For example, the report stated that “[c]ivil laws that permit only heterosexual
marriage reflect and honor a collective moral judgment about human sexuality.” Id. at 15. It
continued, “This judgment entails both moral disapproval of homosexuality, and a moral
conviction that heterosexuality better comports with traditional (especially Judeo-Christian)
morality.” Id. at 15–16. Allowing same-sex marriage would “‘trivialize[] the legitimate status
of marriage and demean[] it by putting a stamp of approval . . . on a union that many people . . .
think is immoral.’” Id. at 16 (quoting Henry Hyde, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee).
The report referred to the political and legal movement in support of marriage equality as an
“assault against traditional heterosexual marriage laws” and referred to same-sex marriage as
“a truly radical proposal that would fundamentally alter the institution of marriage.” Id. at 4,
12.
131. Information about the history of each state’s ban is available at Winning in the States,
FREEDOM
TO
MARRY,
http://www.freedomtomarry.org/pages/winning-in-the-states
[https://perma.cc/22TU-883B] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
132. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
133. Steve Sanders, Same-Sex Marriage Symposium: Gay Marriage, Democracy, and
Judicial Review, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 18, 2012, 10:30 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/
2012/09/same-sex-marriage-symposium-gay-marriage-democracy-and-judicial-review/
[https://perma.cc/37D8-EHMP].
134. For treatment of this history, see generally MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET
TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, BACKLASH, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (2013).
135. See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? 355–419 (2d ed. 2008).
136. Nate Silver, How Opinion on Same-Sex Marriage Is Changing, and What It Means,
N.Y.
TIMES:
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT
(Mar.
26,
2013,
10:10
AM),
https://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/26/how-opinion-on-same-sex-marriage-ischanging-and-what-it-means/ [https://perma.cc/7Q9F-ABZ6] (presenting data demonstrating
the rise of marriage equality beginning in 1996 at an average rate of 2 percent per year, and
observing that “this seems to reflect a steady gain in support for same-sex marriage rather than
there having been any one inflection point”).
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68 percent of Americans said that gay men or lesbians living with children
fit within their definition of “family,” up more than 10 percent from 2003.137
Over the same period, the number of Americans reporting that they did not
have any gay friends or family members decreased from 58 percent to
40 percent, and in 2010 only 18 percent said they did not know anyone who
was gay.138
Three months before Windsor was decided in 2013, the Pew Research
Center reported that “[t]he rise in support for same-sex marriage over the past
decade is among the largest changes in opinion on any policy issue over this
time period.”139 The “long-term shift” in attitudes toward marriage equality
was “unambiguous.”140 In the months leading up to Windsor, a number of
media and polling companies reported that support for same-sex marriage
had moved above 50 percent.141 Gallup found that 53 percent of Americans
thought “marriages between same-sex couples should . . . be recognized by
the law as valid, with the same rights as traditional marriages”—a number
that had been steadily increasing from 27 percent in 1996.142 Pew found that
66 percent agreed that “same-sex couples should have the same legal rights
as heterosexual couples”143—which, of course, was inconsistent with
DOMA, as DOMA denied married same-sex couples all the federal rights
that opposite-sex couples received. A poll in early 2013 specifically about
DOMA found that 59 percent of Americans opposed allowing the federal
government to deny benefits and protections to legally married same-sex
couples, and 62 percent agreed that doing so was a form of
“discrimination.”144
Opinion polling tells only part of the story. Polls measure attitudes, which
both respond and contribute to changes in the larger culture. In the decades
leading to the marriage decisions, the status of gays and lesbians in that larger
culture had changed dramatically. Gays and lesbians had become visible in
media and popular culture.145 Their support was sought by political parties
and politicians, including a presidential candidate as early as 1991, Bill
Clinton, who told a crowd of gay and lesbian advocates, “I have a vision of
America, and you are part of it.”146 Congress had voted to lift the ban on
137. BRIAN POWELL ET AL., COUNTED OUT: SAME-SEX RELATIONS AND AMERICANS’
DEFINITIONS OF FAMILY 5 (2010).
138. Id.
139. Growing Support for Gay Marriage, supra note 124.
140. Id.
141. See Silver, supra note 136.
142. Gay and Lesbian Rights, supra note 37.
143. Growing Support for Gay Marriage, supra note 124.
144. Joseph Patrick McCormick, Poll: 59% of Americans Oppose the Defense of Marriage
Act, PINKNEWS (Feb. 20, 2013), http://www.pinknews.co.uk/2013/02/20/poll-59-ofamericans-oppose-the-defense-of-marriage-act/ [https://perma.cc/M6QY-9XT6].
145. WALTERS, supra note 93, at 13 (“Visibility is . . . necessary for equality. It is part of
the trajectory of any movement for inclusion and social change.”).
146. John M. Broder, Gay and Lesbian Group Offers Thanks to Clinton, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
4, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/10/04/us/gay-and-lesbian-group-offers-thanks-toclinton.html [https://perma.cc/72R6-4N3X] (quoting Governor Bill Clinton’s address at the
Palace Theater).
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gays serving openly in the U.S. military.147 Many religious denominations
had become more welcoming.148 The Boy Scouts had lifted their ban on gay
members and were moving toward also lifting their ban on gay adult
leaders.149 Dozens of openly gay politicians were winning elections in every
cycle, in offices ranging from city council to U.S. Senate.150 More and more
same-sex couples were adopting and raising children.151 A president in 2012,
Barack Obama, endorsed marriage equality,152 and a majority of U.S.
senators also supported it.153 Also in 2012, voters in four statewide
referenda—in Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, and Washington—legalized
same-sex marriage, which broke a string of more than thirty previous defeats
around the country.154 By the day Windsor was decided, nine states and the
District of Columbia had legalized same-sex marriage by legislative vote,
popular referendum, or state judicial decision.155
By the time of Obergefell two years later, majority support for same-sex
marriage had become unambiguous, and the steady long-term upward trend
line demonstrated that this was not an ephemeral or transitory state of affairs.
Several polling sources reported that support was at “record” highs of
60 percent or more.156 Much of the change was driven by generational
147. Elisabeth Bumiller, Obama Ends ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ Policy, N.Y. TIMES (July 22,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/23/us/23military.html [https://perma.cc/4N2E8UB8].
148. See, e.g., David Masci, National Congregations Study Finds More Church Acceptance
of Gays and Lesbians, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 25, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2014/09/25/new-study-finds-a-greater-church-acceptance-of-gays-and-lesbians-2/
[https://perma.cc/N5FD-FKUD].
149. Erik Eckholm, Boy Scouts Move to Lift Ban on Gay Youth Members, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
19, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/20/us/boy-scouts-move-to-lift-ban-on-gaymembers.html [https://perma.cc/JKU8-4HEM].
150. See Our History, VICTORY FUND, https://victoryfund.org/about/history/
[https://perma.cc/6ULF-C4XX] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
151. Lucas Grindley, Gayby Boom? Census Shows Rise in Adoptions, ADVOCATE (June
14, 2011, 10:10 AM), https://www.advocate.com/news/daily-news/2011/06/14/gayby-boomfound-us-census-figures [https://perma.cc/6JPR-VC6V] (reporting that, in 2010, 19 percent of
same-sex couples reported having adopted a child, up from 8 percent in 2000).
152. Peter Wallsten & Scott Wilson, Obama Endorses Gay Marriage, Says Same-Sex
Couples Should Have Right to Wed, WASH. POST. (May 9, 2012),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2012/05/09/gIQAivsWDU_story.html
[http://perma.cc/AL9D-EEBT].
153. Elspeth Reeve & Philip Bump, A Map Showing the Country’s Sudden Move Towards
Marriage Equality, ATLANTIC (Apr. 11, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/
2013/04/gay-rights-marriage-map-gif/315435/ [https://perma.cc/C86T-F2U5].
154. Walter Olson, Republicans Helped Same-Sex Marriage Win at the Polls, WASH. POST.
(Nov. 30, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/republicans-helped-same-sexmarriage-win-at-the-polls/2012/11/30/7db4e37c-3a45-11e2-8a97-363b0f9a0ab3_story.html
[https://perma.cc/F3JR-U3MK].
155. See L.A. Times Staff, Timeline: Gay Marriage Chronology, L.A. TIMES (June 26,
2015),
http://graphics.latimes.com/usmap-gay-marriage-chronology/
[https://perma.cc/
H5YV-2NGV].
156. Scott Clement & Robert Barnes, Poll: Gay-Marriage Support at Record High,
WASH. POST (Apr. 23, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/pollgay-marriage-support-at-record-high/2015/04/22/f6548332-e92a-11e4-aae1-d642717d8afa_
story.html [https://perma.cc/H9KL-DDH3] (reporting 61 percent support); Justin McCarthy,
Record-High 60% of Americans Support Same-Sex Marriage, GALLUP (May 19, 2015),
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replacement—much larger shares of younger Americans than older
Americans supported same-sex marriage.157 But it was also clear that
Americans of all generations, races, religions, and party affiliations were
increasing their support for same-sex marriage.158
This change was evident even in the arguments states used in federal
litigation to defend their same-sex marriage bans. The campaigns to enact
the mini-DOMAs had sought to arouse negative attitudes toward gays and
lesbians,159 and “many of those who defended a traditional understanding of
marriage repeatedly challenged the notion that same-sex relationships were
as good (or as loving or as committed) as different sex ones.”160 Yet in
federal court, the states took pains not to argue that the bans were justified
because gays and lesbians were immoral or in some way unfit for marriage.
For example, Michigan claimed that “[b]y reaffirming the definition of
marriage that has always existed in Michigan, Michigan’s voters did not
disparage other relationships or deny the obvious point that same-sex couples
can provide loving homes.”161 Instead, the states argued that the bans
advanced their government interest in promoting “responsible
procreation.”162 That the states felt it necessary to build their defenses
around an hypothesized purpose that struck many observers as absurd—the
Court in Obergefell would dismiss the responsible procreation theory as
“counterintuitive”163 and “wholly illogical”164—was in itself powerful
evidence of how much had changed in American attitudes and culture.
III. DIALOGIC JUDICIAL REVIEW
This Part turns to the theoretical framing that is necessary to my overall
thesis that Lawrence, Windsor, and Obergefell should be understood
collectively as illustrating the process of dialogic judicial review.165 My
point of departure is Barry Friedman’s work on “dialogue and judicial
http://news.gallup.com/poll/183272/record-high-americans-support-sex-marriage.aspx
[https://perma.cc/P6ER-SKZN] (reporting 60 percent support).
157. See Growing Support for Gay Marriage, supra note 124 (reporting that 70 percent of
“Millennials” supported same-sex marriage, as opposed to 31 percent of those born between
1928 and 1945).
158. Vedantam, supra note 97 (citing the view of a sociologist who had tracked attitudes
toward same-sex marriage over two decades that “the national change was less about older
Americans dying and leaving behind a more liberal America, and more about the fact that
many Americans who once opposed gay marriage have changed their minds or softened their
opposition”).
159. Sanders, supra note 130, at 679–81.
160. Carlos A. Ball, Bigotry and Same-Sex Marriage, 84 UMKC L. REV. 639, 654 (2016).
161. Brief for Michigan Defendants-Appellants at 4, DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th
Cir. 2014) (No. 14-1341), 2014 WL 1998573, at *4.
162. Jeffrey Rosen, The Laughable Argument Against Gay Marriage, NEW REPUBLIC (Mar. 26,
2013), https://newrepublic.com/article/112778/supreme-court-gay-marriage-case-2013-laughableargument [https://perma.cc/44FK-FG55].
163. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015).
164. Id. (quoting Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1223 (10th Cir. 2014)).
165. This term has been used by scholars to describe a number of related but distinct ideas
about constitutional interpretation. See Mark Tushnet, Dialogic Judicial Review, 61 ARK. L.
REV. 205, 205 (2008).
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review,”166 which argues that the Constitution “is interpreted on a daily basis
through an elaborate dialogue as to its meaning” that involves the courts,
political actors such as legislatures, and the people generally.167 Through
this process, constitutional law emerges from a larger social and cultural
dialogue in which the Court participates and to which it responds.
In this dialogic model, courts “do not stand aloof from society and declare
rights. Rather, they interact on a daily basis with society, taking part in an
interpretive dialogue.”168 As a result of this process, Friedman writes in The
Will of the People: How Public Opinion Has Influenced the Supreme Court
and Shaped the Meaning of the Constitution, the Supreme Court’s decisions
“hew rather closely to the mainstream of popular judgment about the
meaning of the Constitution” and “tend to converge with the considered
judgment of the American people.”169 In this process, “[p]opular politics and
Court decisions, moving together sometimes in harmony and sometimes not,
have shaped the meaning of the Constitution.”170 Other constitutional
scholars and historians have “converg[ed] around a similar set of ideas and
understandings.”171 Harry Kalven seemed to have something like this in
mind when he described the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence as “a
sort of Socratic dialogue . . . between the Court and the society as to the
meaning of freedom of speech.”172
Friedman’s work fits within a larger line of commentary, going back to a
seminal 1957 article by Robert Dahl,173 which states that the Court
“generally stays within bounds that the American people will tolerate”174 and

166. See generally Friedman, supra note 31.
167. Id. at 580–81.
168. Id.
169. FRIEDMAN, supra note 21, at 14. For commentary and critiques of Friedman’s theory
of the Supreme Court’s work more generally, see, for example, Jenna Bednar, The Dialogic
Theory of Judicial Review: A New Social Science Research Agenda, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1178 (2010); William E. Forbath, The Will of the People? Pollsters, Elites, and Other
Difficulties, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1191 (2010); and Richard Primus, Public Consensus as
Constitutional Authority, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1207 (2010).
170. Friedman, supra note 19, at 1235.
171. Id. (explaining that the interplay of ordinary politics, interactions between the
executive and legislative branches, and social culture shapes how Americans interpret the
Constitution); see also MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 5 (2004) (arguing that “judicial
decision making involves a combination of legal and political factors”); Reva B. Siegel, Text
in Contest: Gender and the Constitution from a Social Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L.
REV. 297, 303 (2001) (stating that in times of “constitutional mobilization, citizens make
claims about the Constitution’s meaning in a wide variety of social settings,” which plays an
important role in shaping how both courts and the general population interpret the text).
172. HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA 23
(1988).
173. Robert Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as National
Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957). Dahl described the Court as “inevitably a part of the
dominant national [governing] alliance” and “an essential part of the political leadership”
whose legitimacy came from decisions that are consistent with the dominant alliance. Id. at
293.
174. Primus, supra note 169, at 1212.
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that it is, in practice, more often than not a “majoritarian” institution.175
Research in political science also has found that the Supreme Court tends to
be responsive to public preferences. One study based on Court decisions
from 1953 to 1996 concluded that “the Court’s policy outcomes are indeed
affected by public opinion . . . to a degree far greater than previously
documented.”176
The idea of dialogic judicial review goes beyond just the principle that the
Court’s decisions tend to align with public preferences. Under the dialogic
model, not only does the Court listen and respond to public attitudes, its
decisions also contribute to shaping public attitudes or perceptions about an
issue, a proposition for which there is empirical support in social science
literature.177 According to Friedman, “Constitutional change occurs as
public understandings of constitutional meaning and judicial interpretations
of the Constitution interact with one another.”178 As a result, “judicial
meanings shift in response to changing public understandings, and judicial
decisions provoke the public to consider what the Constitution ought to
mean. Through this interaction, the Constitution changes.”179 Such a
process necessarily is “open-ended . . . and so the process must go on with
another and yet another question being put.”180 Judicial determinations about
the Constitution’s meaning are rarely final, and public resistance or backlash
to particular decisions (such as Roe v. Wade181 with abortion or Furman v.
Georgia182 with the death penalty)183 will cause the Court to trim its sails in
later decisions and sometimes to reverse itself altogether.184
The idea of dialogic judicial review puts in perspective the role of the
judiciary as a so-called “countermajoritarian” institution. The starting point
in this line of commentary is Alexander Bickel’s now-classic 1962 work The
Least Dangerous Branch, in which Bickel coined the term
“countermajoritarian difficulty” to describe the question of why an unelected
judiciary should have the power to decide important issues in a way that the

175. Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a ‘Majoritarian’ Institution?, 2010 SUP. CT.
REV. 103, 103; see also Joseph Landau, New Majoritarian Constitutionalism, 103 IOWA L.
REV. 1033, 1045–60 (2018) (discussing three models of “new majoritarian” constitutional
decision-making by the Court).
176. Kevin T. McGuire & James A. Stimson, The Least Dangerous Branch Revisited: New
Evidence on Supreme Court Responsiveness to Public Preferences, 66 J. POL. 1018, 1033
(2004).
177. See, e.g., Margaret E. Tankard & Elizabeth Levy Paluck, The Effect of a Supreme
Court Decision Regarding Gay Marriage on Social Norms and Personal Attitudes, 28
PSYCHOL. SCI. 1334, 1341 (2017) (finding an increase in perceived social norms in support of
gay marriage after the Obergefell ruling).
178. Friedman, supra note 19, at 1236.
179. Id. (footnote omitted).
180. See KALVEN, supra note 172, at 23.
181. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
182. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
183. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 21, at 287–88, 297–99 (discussing how the Court reacted
in response to the negative public reactions to Furman and Roe).
184. See Friedman, supra note 19, at 1237–38.
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states or political branches have no direct power to override.185 While not
diminishing the importance of the question Bickel presented or the fact that
some of the Court’s decisions truly have been countermajoritarian (flag
burning comes to mind186), dialogic judicial review demonstrates that the
problem is far from pervasive in constitutional law because most decisions
are (or shortly become) consistent with consensus, or at least majority, views
about the Constitution’s meaning.187
In a related vein of scholarship to Friedman’s work on dialogue and
judicial review, Robert Post, Reva B. Siegel, and other scholars have
explained how constitutional law is shaped by courts’ interaction with
nonjudicial actors. Post distinguishes between “constitutional law”—that is,
“constitutional law as it is made from the perspective of the judiciary”—and
“constitutional culture,” which embraces “the beliefs and values of
nonjudicial actors . . . that encompass[] extrajudicial beliefs about the
substance of the Constitution.”188 Post argues that “constitutional law and
culture are locked in a dialectical relationship, so that constitutional law both
arises from and in turn regulates culture.”189 The constitutional law that
emerges from this “dialectic between constitutional culture and the
institutional practices of constitutional adjudication” is, Post explains,
“neither autonomous nor fixed.”190 Because constitutional law does not exist
independent of culture, “constitutional law properly evolves as culture
Because “culture is always dynamic and contested,
evolves.”191
constitutional law will necessarily also be dynamic and contested.”192 Social
movements play a role in this dialectic process of constitutional culture by
developing a constitutional language for their own claims,193 as do the cause
lawyers who “aim to change the law in ways that restructure dominant social
configurations that marginalize or oppress certain groups.”194
185. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE
THE BAR OF POLITICS 16–23 (1962).

LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT

186. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 419–20 (1989) (invalidating prohibitions on flag
desecration that were enforced in forty-eight of the fifty states).
187. Friedman has said he wrote The Will of the People “to change the nature of the
conversation about judicial review, from the overly simplistic premises of the
countermajoritarian difficulty, to a more nuanced and accurate view that sees judicial
decisionmaking as symbiotic with other aspects of constitutional democracy.” Friedman,
supra note 19, at 1254.
188. Post, supra note 33, at 8.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 11.
191. Id. at 83.
192. Id. (footnote omitted).
193. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 19, at 1245 & n.84; see also Robert C. Post & Reva
B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation
of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 1980–2020 (2003); Reva B. Siegel,
Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191,
201–36 (2008); Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality,
Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 968–76 (2002).
194. Scott Barclay & Shauna Fisher, Cause Lawyers in the First Wave of Same Sex
Marriage Litigation, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 84, 92 (Austin Sarat &
Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 2006).
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Siegel has defined “constitutional culture” as “the network of
understandings and practices that structure our constitutional tradition,
including those that shape law but would not be recognized as ‘lawmaking’
according to the legal system’s own formal criteria”195 and as “the
understandings of role and practices of argument that guide interactions
among citizens and officials in matters concerning the Constitution’s
meaning.”196 Constitutional culture “mediates the relation of law and
politics” and “supplies understandings of role and practices of argument
through which citizens and officials can propose new ways of enacting the
society’s defining commitments.”197 It also “enables [social] movements to
negotiate the law/politics distinction and propose (or resist) alternative
understandings of the constitutional tradition.”198
This understanding of constitutional culture shares common themes with
Larry Kramer’s work on “popular constitutionalism,” which advocates a
return to the founding generation’s view of the Constitution as “a special
form of popular law, law made by the people to bind their governors, and so
subject to rules and considerations that made it qualitatively different from
(and not just superior to) statutory or common law.”199 Rejecting “judicial
supremacy” as inconsistent with the model the framers intended, Kramer
argues that “[w]e need processes, formal and informal, by which our
constitutional understandings and commitments can be challenged,
reinterpreted, and renewed.”200 Kramer has lauded work by Siegel and
others that seeks to understand the “external” influences on constitutional
law, calling it “the new center of academic work in constitutional theory.”201
The views of elites, including judges on state and federal courts, also play
a role in shaping how constitutional ideas move from being “off the wall” to
“on the wall,” as Jack M. Balkin has described the phenomenon. “Arguments
move from off the wall to on the wall,” he writes, “because people and
institutions are willing to put their reputations on the line and state that an
argument formerly thought beyond the pale is not crazy at all, but is actually
a pretty good legal argument.”202 Further, “it matters greatly who vouches
for the argument—whether they are well-respected, powerful and influential,

195. Siegel, supra note 171, at 303.
196. Siegel, supra note 23, at 1325. Siegel distinguishes this definition from a different
understanding of constitutional culture as “social values relevant to matters of constitutional
law that an official engaged in responsive interpretation incorporates into the fabric of
constitutional law.” Id.
197. Id. at 1327.
198. Id. at 1329.
199. Larry D. Kramer, Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 10 (2001).
200. Id. at 15.
201. Larry Kramer, Generating Constitutional Meaning, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1439, 1441
(2006).
202. Jack M. Balkin, From off the Wall to on the Wall: How the Mandate Challenge Went
Mainstream, ATLANTIC (June 4, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/
06/from-off-the-wall-to-on-the-wall-how-the-mandate-challenge-went-mainstream/258040/
[https://perma.cc/P24U-QRWT].
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and how they are situated in institutions with professional authority or in
institutions like politics or the media that shape public opinion.”203
The work of David Strauss, who is perhaps best known for his exposition
of the idea of a “living constitution,”204 also fits within the dialogic model as
I am broadly defining it in this Article. The gay and lesbian dignity cases
provide useful examples of what Strauss has called “common law
constitutional interpretation.”205 The common-law approach “rejects the
notion that law must be derived from some authoritative source,” such as
constitutional text alone, “and finds it instead in understandings that evolve
over time.”206 Strauss has written that much of modern judicial review
“looks to the future, not the past” and “tries to bring laws up to date, rather
than deferring to tradition.”207 Such judicial review “anticipates and
accommodates, rather than limits, developments in popular opinion.”208 One
way that courts engage in the modernizing form of judicial review is to
“strike down a statute if it no longer reflects popular opinion or if the trends
in popular opinion are running against it. Modernization tries to anticipate
developments in the law, invalidating laws that would not be enacted today
or that will soon lose popular support.”209 Strauss suggests that this form of
judicial review has emerged in response to the criticism of judicial review as
antidemocratic. The approach of “anticipating changes that have majority
support” gives judicial review “a more comfortable place in democratic
government.”210
Of course, there are differences in approach among all these scholars
whose work I include within the dialogic model as I am describing it in this
Article. But they all contrast starkly with scholars and jurists who take
exception to the idea that constitutional law should be understood as
something malleable that may be shaped according to public attitudes,
culture, or social change. For example, the late Justice Antonin Scalia, one
of the best-known proponents of originalism as an alternative to the living
constitution, frequently argued that “[t]he Constitution is a written
instrument. As such its meaning does not alter. That which it meant when
adopted it means now.”211 Yet despite the proliferation of academic
commentary that originalism has created, it would be difficult to argue, as an
203. Id.
204. See generally DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010).
205. See generally David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U.
CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996).
206. Id. at 879.
207. David A. Strauss, The Modernizing Mission of Judicial Review, 76 U. CHI. L. REV.
859, 860 (2009).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 861.
210. Id.; see also Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution,
103 NW. U. L. REV 549, 563 (2009) (arguing that courts work in cooperation with “the
dominant national political coalition” and invalidate “statutes passed by older regimes that are
inconsistent with the current coalition’s values”).
211. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS 81 (2012) (quoting South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448 (1905)).
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empirical matter, that the Supreme Court does not regularly adapt the
Constitution’s “majestic generalities,”212 such as liberty and equal
protection, to fit modern circumstances. Dialogic judicial review, as I have
described it above, attempts to explain the legitimacy of that enterprise. My
goal in the remainder of this Article is to demonstrate that the gay and lesbian
dignity cases, considered collectively, provide a useful illustration of how it
works.
IV. THE LAWFULNESS OF THE DIGNITY DECISIONS
In the previous two Parts I sketched the rapid and dramatic changes
achieved by the social movement for gay and lesbian equality and described
dialogic constitutional interpretation. In this Part, I bring those discussions
together to describe how the trilogy of gay and lesbian dignity cases
demonstrates a Supreme Court in dialogue with the larger society on the
question of how the Constitution should account for the changing social
meaning of particular forms of government-imposed discrimination against
gays and lesbians.
This Part’s argument can be sketched as follows. The social meaning of
government discrimination has long played an important role in
constitutional decisions involving equality and the treatment of minority
groups.213 In particular, laws that are commonly understood to demean and
impose stigma are repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment, in both its
original and contemporary understandings.214 Using this anti-stigma
principle, the Supreme Court condemned criminal sodomy laws and federal
and state marriage restrictions.215 As American attitudes and culture evolved
concerning the status of gays and lesbians, so did the social meaning of
government anti-gay discrimination.216 By invoking the idea of “dignity” in
these decisions, the Court was both interpreting and helping to further
construct social meaning. The bedrock principles of these decisions, that
gays and lesbians had “a just claim to dignity” and “dignity in their own
distinct identity,”217 which most Americans once would have rejected, were
now consistent with mainstream public attitudes and culture. The Court gave
legal substance to this attitudinal and cultural change when it concluded that
the social meaning of sodomy laws and marriage restrictions was now
understood to be the imposition of dignitary harm—that is, the kind of stigma
and humiliation that could be reached by the Fourteenth Amendment. This
Part concludes with some observations about the additional dignitary harms
engendered by the countermajoritarian nature of the state marriage bans.218
212. William J. Brennan, Jr., Speech at the Georgetown University Text and Teaching
Symposium (Oct. 12, 1985), https://www.thirteen.org/wnet/supremecourt/democracy/
sources_document7.html [https://perma.cc/ZU4M-V9PC] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
213. See infra Part IV.A.
214. See infra Part IV.B.
215. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
216. See infra Part IV.C.
217. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596 (2015).
218. See infra Part IV.D.
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The fact that the Court’s holdings in the gay and lesbian dignity cases
aligned with the American majority’s preferred policy outcomes would
merely make them majoritarian. But the fact that the Court reached those
holdings by interpreting and helping to construct the social meaning of the
laws at issue in these cases made them dialogic. In other words, these cases
were more than simply examples of the Court following public opinion. And
the fact that they ultimately rested on well-established constitutional norms
made them legitimate and lawful.
A. Social Meaning in Constitutional Law
“Social meaning” refers to “the semiotic content attached to various
actions, or inactions, or statuses, within a particular context.”219 Lawrence
Lessig has said that social meanings are “frameworks of understanding
within which individuals live; a way to describe what they take or understand
various actions, or inactions, or statuses to be.”220 Social meaning is another
way of referring to a law’s expressive effect. As Lessig observes, “[I]f an
action creates a stigma, that stigma is a social meaning.”221
The Court’s equality decisions often have articulated and exposed the
social meaning of particular forms of government discrimination by
providing candid descriptions of how the discrimination was experienced by
the targeted group and by providing candid discussion of the denigrating
message this discrimination communicated about the group’s standing in the
political community. For example, social meaning has been a prominent
focus of many of the Court’s racial equal protection cases. In one of the first
cases applying the Fourteenth Amendment to laws discriminating on the
basis of race, Strauder v. West Virginia,222 which invalidated a state law
excluding blacks from serving as trial jurors, the Court called the statute
“practically a brand upon [blacks], affixed by the law, an assertion of their
inferiority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impediment to
securing to individuals of the race that equal justice which the law aims to
secure to all others.”223 This is a classic statement about social meaning.
An example of the Court attempting to impose a reading of social meaning
that did not ring true even at the time it was written came in Plessy v.
Ferguson.224 Examining a law that required separate accommodations for
white and black railroad passengers, the Court denied that the law had the
same social meaning—that is, the same stigmatic effect and dignitary harm—
as the jury law in Strauder. The constitutionality of the railroad law in Plessy
turned on this supposed difference in social meaning. “Laws permitting, and
even requiring” the physical separation of blacks and whites “do not
219. Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 951
(1995) (footnote omitted).
220. Id. at 952.
221. Id. at 951.
222. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
223. Id. at 308.
224. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other,” the Court
maintained.225
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to consist in
the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the
colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of
anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to
put that construction upon it.226

The Court’s refusal to acknowledge the obvious social meaning of enforced
segregation is a primary reason why Plessy is regarded today as not only
flawed but disingenuous.
The social meaning of racial discrimination also was central to Brown v.
Board of Education,227 where the Court observed, without the need to cite
any authority, that “the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted
as denoting the inferiority of the negro group.”228 This blunt statement of
social meaning was essential to the Court’s further conclusion, which was
supported with citations to social science research,229 that “[t]o separate
[black children] from others . . . solely because of their race generates a
feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”230
In a famous article titled “The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions,”
Charles Black observed, about the critics of Brown,
It seems that what is being said [by such critics] is that, while no actual
doubt exists as to what segregation is for and what kind of societal pattern
it supports and implements, there is no ritually sanctioned way in which the
Court, as a Court, can permissibly learn what is obvious to everybody else
and to the Justices as individuals.231

Black scoffed at the need for “[e]legantia juris and conceptual algebra” in
evaluating the harms of government-enforced segregation.232 To find for
purposes of constitutional adjudication that mandatory school segregation
offended the Constitution, it was sufficient to articulate its social meaning,
as the Court had done. “[T]he fact that the Court has assumed as true a matter
of common knowledge in regard to broad societal patterns, is (to say the very
least) pretty far down the list of things to protest against.”233
225. Id. at 544.
226. Id. at 551.
227. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
228. Id. at 494.
229. See id. at 494 n.11.
230. Id. at 494.
231. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421,
427 (1960).
232. Id. at 429.
233. Id. at 428. In later civil rights era cases, articulation of social meaning allowed the
Court to candidly expose the machinations of southern racists. In Anderson v. Martin, 375
U.S. 399 (1964), for example, the Court struck down a Louisiana election law that required a
candidate’s race to be specified on the ballot. Ostensibly, the law treated blacks and whites
alike. But the Court recognized that, in the context of Louisiana racial politics in the 1960s,
such a law “furnishes a vehicle by which racial prejudice may be so aroused as to operate
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Through laws and policies, governments contribute to the creation of
social meaning.234 Laws and public policies “act to construct the social
structures, or social norms . . . the social meanings that surround us. For
these social meanings are what is orthodox. They constitute what is authority
for a particular society, or particular culture.”235 The social meaning of a law
is not necessarily the same thing as the government’s purpose or intent, or
the lawmakers’ motives.236 Thus, it is possible to conclude that a law has the
operation and effect of imposing stigma on a group without concluding that
it was the government’s purpose to do so.237
Courts also interpret, construct, and reinforce social meaning through
judicial review. Deborah L. Brake writes that “[e]quality claims are largely
about challenges to existing social meaning and the reconstruction of social
relationships based on changes in social meaning.”238 Equality claims
“challenge[] existing status hierarchies and the social meanings that have
held them in place.”239 Richard H. Pildes has argued that, rather than
thinking about constitutional rights as trumps, which is how constitutional
theory and political philosophy tend to understand them, we should
understand rights as “tools courts use to evaluate the social meaning and
expressive dimensions of government action”240 and that “[i]ncorporating a
theory of social meaning and the expressive dimensions of state action into

against one group because of race and for another.” Id. at 402. The social meaning of a
requirement that race be listed in the ballot was clear: the law placed “the power of the State
behind a racial classification that induces racial prejudice at the polls.” Id.
234. Social meanings are a part of everyday life as “the collection of understandings or
expectations shared by some group at a particular time,” understandings or expectations that
are “taken for granted by those within the group at issue.” Lessig, supra note 219, at 958. For
example, “A man announces that he is a Nazi. His announcement is a text. This text (in postWorld War II Western culture) stigmatizes him.” Id. at 959.
235. Id. at 947.
236. Id. at 953; see also Deborah L. Brake, When Equality Leaves Everyone Worse Off:
The Problem of Leveling Down in Equality Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 582 (2004)
(“The expressive meaning of an action is not necessarily a function of the actor’s intent; rather,
it is the socially constructed meaning that is recognizable by the community, exercising
interpretive judgment.” (footnote omitted)).
237. For example, as Carlos Ball has written, the Court in Obergefell
did not claim, as it had in striking down the Defense of Marriage Act in United
States v. Windsor, that the marriage bans were the result of animus against lesbians
and gay men. Instead, the Court in Obergefell emphasized the harmful, demeaning,
and stigmatizing consequences of denying same-sex couples the opportunity to
marry. Rather than focusing on the intent or motivations behind the bans, the Court
focused on their impact.
Carlos A. Ball, Bigotry and Same-Sex Marriage, 84 UMKC L. REV. 639, 639–40 (2016)
(footnotes omitted).
238. Brake, supra note 236, at 573.
239. Id. at 574.
240. Pildes, supra note 24, at 725. Pildes argues that “American constitutional law
provides a more expansive conception of harm because it is more attuned than conventional
rights theory appreciates to the social meanings of state action. Expressive harms, no less than
material harms to these kind of individual interests, ground constitutional doctrine in many
areas.” Id. at 762.
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constitutional analysis can reconnect constitutional theory to constitutional
practice.”241
The Court’s exposition of social meaning has shaped equality doctrine by
helping to define the forms of discrimination the Constitution forbids.
Elizabeth Anderson and Pildes have argued that “[t]he most conventional
expressive concerns with equal protection doctrine involve issues of stigma
and second-class citizenship.”242 Michael Dorf writes that “expressivist
notions” of harm are “deeply embedded” in American constitutional
doctrine243 and that “a cross-ideological consensus holds that some
government expressions of second-class citizenship offend equal protection
precisely because of their social meaning.”244 Expressive harm, Pildes says,
“results from the ideas or attitudes expressed through a governmental action
rather than from the more tangible or material consequences the action brings
about.”245 Accordingly, “the meaning of a governmental action is just as
important as what that action does. Public policies can violate the
Constitution not only because they bring about concrete costs but because the
meaning they convey expresses inappropriate respect for relevant
constitutional norms.”246 On this understanding, constitutional law is less
about identifying and protecting certain individual rights and more about
“secur[ing] a common good,” and “judicial interpretation of that common
good, not an atomistic conception of rights,” is what “propels constitutional
law.”247
The Court’s decisions both identify and help to further construct social
meaning. Its use of social meaning may be both descriptive, in that it
captures current attitudes, and normative, in that it seeks to educate and
persuade those who are not yet part of the majority. Many of the Court’s
241. Id. at 726.
242. Elizabeth Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1537 (2000); see also Ball, supra note 237, at 640
(observing that it is “not unusual for the Supreme Court, in assessing the constitutionality of
laws, to address their effects on those subject to their regulation” (footnote omitted)).
243. Michael C. Dorf, Same-Sex Marriage, Second-Class Citizenship, and Law’s Social
Meanings, 97 VA. L. REV. 1267, 1276 (2011).
244. Id. at 1298; see also Shari Seidman Diamond & Andrew Koppelman, Measured
Endorsement, 60 MD. L. REV. 713, 733 (2001) (“The social meaning of government action
has always been understood to be relevant to the determination of whether a law denies to
some ‘the equal protection of the laws.’” (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV)).
245. Pildes, supra note 24, at 755.
246. Id.; see also Natasha J. Silber, Note, Unscrambling the Egg: Social Constructionism
and the Antireification Principle in Constitutional Law, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1873, 1907 (2013)
(arguing that “an important function of constitutional law is to regulate social meaning in
accordance with the view that social categories like race are mere constructs”).
247. Pildes, supra note 24, at 750. This principle does not just apply to constitutional norms
concerning equality. For example, “[i]f state action ‘conveys a message’ of religious
endorsement, it is invalid,” regardless of whether there are “material burdens to individual
interests.” Id. In Lynch v. Donnelly, for example, the Court observed that whether a particular
religious display constitutes an endorsement of religion is a question “to be answered on the
basis of judicial interpretation of social facts.” 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). For additional
discussions of social meaning in constitutional law beyond the context of equality claims, see,
for example, Neal Devins, Social Meaning and School Vouchers, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV.
919 (2001).
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decisions on seemingly controversial subjects are majoritarian.248 Yet, to say
a decision is “majoritarian” is not necessarily to say that it yet reflects a
widely shared consensus or what Bickel called “general assent.”249 Social
meaning can also be contestable.250 And so the Court’s decisions also seek
to lead, teach, and persuade. This, too, is consistent with the dialogic model
of judicial review.251 The Court’s intervention can become part of the
process by which social meaning is constructed, including by reinforcing
emerging and, in some cases, majoritarian attitudes and values.252
B. Stigma as a Constitutional Injury
The previous section focused on social meaning in constitutional law
generally. But one particular form of social meaning has been central to
Fourteenth Amendment law, including the gay and lesbian dignity cases: the
imposition of stigma. Laws that demean or inflict stigma without a legitimate
public-regarding purpose have long been understood to be repugnant to the
Fourteenth Amendment.253 This principle goes back to the drafting and
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment itself. As Christopher A. Bracey
writes, “Dignitary and stigmatic harms were the hallmark of the slavery
regime” and the Reconstruction Amendments “directly repudiated Justice
Taney’s declaration in Dred Scott that blacks could not be citizens because

248. See supra notes 173–76 and accompanying text.
249. BICKEL, supra note 185, at 239.
250. See Sanford Levinson, They Whisper: Reflections on Flags, Monuments, and State
Holidays, and the Construction of Social Meaning in a Multicultural Society, 70 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1079, 1102 (1995) (observing that, where social meaning is contested, judges may
have the difficulty of justifying a decision “negating all other interpretive possibilities save
the particular one that it chooses to privilege”); see also Diamond & Koppelman, supra note
244, at 736 (“Sometimes . . . a single social meaning is so predominant that the existence of
idiosyncratic views doesn’t matter. In other cases, there will be a variety of widely held
views.”). An example where the social meaning of government discrimination remains
contested is the so-called “colorblind” understanding of racial equal protection. The
colorblind understanding of racial equal protection does not distinguish between invidious
uses of race based on demeaning stereotypes and benign uses of race intended to advance
principles of antisubordination and remedy past discrimination. For example, in City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. the Court said a city’s minority set-aside program for city
construction contracts “denies certain citizens the opportunity to compete for a fixed
percentage of public contracts based solely upon their race” and therefore, “[t]o whatever
racial group these citizens belong, their ‘personal rights’ to be treated with equal dignity and
respect are implicated.” 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989). Justice Stevens memorably differed from
this approach by invoking his own vivid comparison of social meanings: “The consistency
that the Court espouses would disregard the difference between a ‘No Trespassing’ sign and
a welcome mat.” Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 245 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
251. Friedman, supra note 19, at 1236 (arguing that “judicial meanings shift in response to
changing public understandings, and judicial decisions provoke the public to consider what
the Constitution ought to mean”).
252. Lessig, supra note 219, at 962 (explaining that social meanings are constructed when
“the contexts within which they exist are changed,” either through intervention or evolution).
253. Anderson & Pildes, supra note 242, at 1537 (“The most conventional expressive
concerns with equal protection doctrine involve issues of stigma and second-class
citizenship.”).
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they were widely regarded by whites as ‘beings of an inferior order, and
altogether unfit to associate with the white race.’”254
Appeals to dignity were used in popular political dialogue not only to
attack slavery but to also attack practices of racial subordination more
generally. Rebecca J. Scott writes that “[t]he late nineteenth-century popular
campaign against legally mandated racial segregation . . . drew upon a
language of dignity, sometimes echoing the uses in earlier French radical
thought of the term dignité.”255 Whereas supporters of government-imposed
segregation portrayed such laws as “aimed merely at maintaining familiar
customs, public comfort, and public order,” opponents “saw an intentional
dignitary offense, precisely because of the ways in which legally mandated
segregation reproduced forms of humiliation practiced against free persons
of colour under slavery.”256 This treatment implicated social meaning. “The
meaning—and the marking—involved in the practice of forced separation
could, in their view, best be understood with reference to the slaveholding
past, as constituting a project of white supremacy for the post-emancipation
future.”257
Similarly, even if modern cases like Brown and Loving v. Virginia258
(which invalidated restrictions on interracial marriage) do not actually use
the word “dignity,” these cases plainly address the dignitary harms that are
imposed by laws whose social meaning was well understood to be racial
subordination.259
The Fourteenth Amendment was, of course, intended to address the
inequality of the newly freed slaves in the wake of the Civil War. But its
drafters and supporters “just as clearly intended its beneficial effects to
extend beyond” race to also reach “class legislation” and “caste systems.”260
Consistent with this understanding, Romer v. Evans,261 the Court’s first
significant gay rights case, opened by quoting the first Justice John Marshall
Harlan’s declaration that “the Constitution ‘neither knows nor tolerates
classes among citizens’”262 and ended with the conclusion that the Colorado
law at issue was unconstitutional because it “classifies homosexuals not to
254. Christopher A. Bracey, Dignity in Race Jurisprudence, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 669, 687,
689 (2005) (quoting Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857)).
255. Rebecca J. Scott, Dignité/Dignidade: Organizing Against Threats to Dignity in
Societies after Slavery, in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN DIGNITY 61, 62 (Christopher McCrudden
ed., 2013).
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
259. See id. at 11 (observing that antimiscegenation laws must be struck down because they
served “no legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious racial discrimination” and
were designed only “to maintain White Supremacy”); supra notes 228–30 and accompanying
text (discussing Brown).
260. WILLIAM D. ARAIZA, ANIMUS: A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO BIAS IN THE LAW 19
(2017); see also Steven G. Calabresi & Hannah M. Begley, Originalism and Same-Sex
Marriage, 70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 648, 686–87 (2016).
261. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
262. Id. at 623 (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
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further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone
else.”263 In recent years—Romer and Windsor both figure into the relevant
line of cases—the Court has made clear that a law’s expression of “animus”
toward a social group is not a legitimate government purpose. This
“prohibition on animus reflects a core constitutional commitment, one that is
most forcefully expressed in the [Fourteenth Amendment].”264
The anti-caste, anti-stigma understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment is
closely related to the principle of “anti-humiliation” that Bruce Ackerman
has identified as the core of Brown and the Court’s other racial equal
protection cases of the Second Reconstruction.265 Ackerman has written that
the “master insight” of Brown was “the Court’s emphasis on the distinctive
wrongness of institutionalized humiliation.”266 Ackerman links this antihumiliation principle to the idea of dignity both in constitutional law and in
the political discourse around civil rights, which suggests that the antihumiliation principle may give the “notoriously protean” idea of dignity a
more “distinctive shape.”267
In an op-ed written after Windsor but before Obergefell, Ackerman
elaborated on this idea, suggesting that the “constitutional legacy” of the
dignity principles “hammered out during the civil rights revolution of the
1960s . . . would strongly support any future Supreme Court decision
extending Justice Kennedy’s reasoning to state statutes discriminating
against gay marriage.”268 Kenji Yoshino amplified this point by arguing that
the anti-humiliation principle informed the Court’s invocations of dignity in
both Windsor and Lawrence.269 “The gay rights domain,” he suggests, “may
provide a particularly sympathetic context from which dignitary claims
would arise, given that gay rights have always been plagued by a politics of
shame.”270 Moreover, “the fact that gay individuals are dispersed throughout
families and institutions across the United States may make their claims to
dignity more intelligible than the traditional ‘discrete and insular
minority.’”271

263. Id. at 635.
264. ARAIZA, supra note 260, at 3.
265. 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 128–29 (2014).
266. Id. at 128. Ackerman writes that Brown’s “commonsense prose helped anchor the
next decade’s constitutional debate” and that “the anti-humiliation theme played a central role
as congressional leaders made their case for the Civil Rights Act in 1964.” Id. at 134, 136.
Speaking about the act, Senator Hubert Humphrey described the “monstrous humiliations”
that discrimination imposed on African Americans and said that “freedom from indignity”
should be added to Franklin Roosevelt’s “four freedoms,” along with freedom of speech,
freedom of conscience, freedom from fear, and freedom from want. Id. at 136–37.
267. Id. at 137.
268. Bruce Ackerman, Dignity Is a Constitutional Principle, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/30/opinion/sunday/dignity-is-a-constitutionalprinciple.html [https://perma.cc/MR7U-WPLA].
269. Kenji Yoshino, The Anti-Humiliation Principle and Same-Sex Marriage, 123 YALE
L.J. 3076, 3082–87 (2014).
270. Id. at 3087.
271. Id. (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 n.4 (1938)).
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C. Dignity and the Evolving Social Meaning of Sodomy Laws
and Marriage Restrictions
As the gay and lesbian social movement generated changes in American
culture and as public attitudes evolved, sodomy laws and marriage
restrictions came to be rejected by growing majorities of Americans.272 The
Court’s role as a participant in the national legal and political dialogue over
the status of gays and lesbians was to translate this evolution of public
attitudes and culture into conclusions about social meaning and stigma, and
it used the language of dignity to do so.
When government power acts on a person in some way, the implications
for dignity are a function of social mores and shared understandings.273 In
Lawrence, Windsor, and Obergefell, the Court was interpreting how
Americans had come to understand the status of gays and lesbians in society
and contributing to the construction of how the social meaning of criminal
sodomy laws and federal and state marriage restrictions had changed. The
central dignitary problem with criminal sodomy laws and federal and state
marriage restrictions was that they inflicted “stigma.”274 Their effects were
to “demean” gays and lesbians.275 Once widely understood as necessary to
protect public morality, such laws were now increasingly understood, the
Court told us, as denials of dignity. This interpretive work was an important
aspect of the Court’s contribution to the dialogue over gay and lesbian rights
and dignity and another sign that it was not merely following public opinion,
but also helping to shape it.
The social and cultural change documented in Part II, together with the
lack of any widespread public backlash to these decisions,276 suggest that the
Court faithfully captured the social meaning of sodomy laws and marriage
restrictions. By the time the Court suggested in Obergefell that gays and
lesbians had a “just claim” to “dignity in their own distinct identity,”277 and
were thus entitled to “equal dignity” under law,278 a majority of Americans
had already formed attitudes that were consistent with that principle.
These decisions were not “the work of a partisan elite” scorning popular
morality and “imposing its policy preferences on the American people,” as
one academic critic of Obergefell has written.279 Rather, they were the work
272. See supra Part II.
273. See Brake, supra note 236, at 582 (observing that the “expressive meaning of an
action . . . is the socially constructed meaning that is recognizable by the community,
exercising interpretive judgment”).
274. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (identifying discussions of stigma in the
three dignity cases).
275. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (“It demeans gays and lesbians
for the State to lock them out of a central institution of the Nation’s society.”); United States
v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013) (noting that DOMA’s imposition of inequality
“demeans the couple”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (noting that sodomy
laws “demean” the existence of homosexuals).
276. See infra notes 361–78 and accompanying text.
277. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2596.
278. Id. at 2608.
279. See Buss, supra note 34, at 25.
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of a Court that was aware of a tectonic shift in public attitudes and culture
and that was shaping these changes into a legal principle—that the
Constitution neither knows nor tolerates classes or castes among citizens—
that was anchored in the purpose and values of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The kinds of laws that violate constitutional norms may evolve, but the
fundamental norms remain constant.
This approach to evaluating the constitutionality of laws was consistent
with the ideas that “government expressions of second-class citizenship” can
be repugnant to the Constitution “precisely because of their social
meaning”280 and that “[p]ublic policies can violate the Constitution not only
because they bring about concrete costs but because the meaning they convey
expresses inappropriate respect for relevant constitutional norms.”281 As
Shari Seidman Diamond and Andrew Koppelman have written, “The social
meaning of government action has always been understood to be relevant to
the determination of whether a law denies to some ‘the equal protection of
the laws.’”282 Stephen G. Calabresi has written that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s anti-caste principle justified the Court’s decision in Obergefell
to strike down state bans on same-sex marriage because the effect of such
discrimination was that it led gays and lesbians to be “treated as outcasts.”283
The word “dignity” captures a basic idea about how government should
treat citizens. Dignity is about “the status of a person within the
community.”284 As Ronald Dworkin explains, human dignity “supposes that
there are ways of treating a man that are inconsistent with recognizing him
as a full member of the human community, and holds that such treatment is
profoundly unjust.”285
The dignity of Lawrence, Windsor, and Obergefell is striking for its
accessibility. It is the dignity of human beings as the idea is understood by
ordinary people. It is a dignity that captures intuitions about what it means
to be a free and autonomous human being who expects to be treated with
respect, both by one’s fellow citizens and by the government. The Court
applied dignity as legal concept, but it spoke about dignity almost entirely in
the vernacular.
For Justice Kennedy, dignity served more as a dialogic device than a
component of formal doctrine. Tribe has written that “Justice Kennedy’s
280. Dorf, supra note 243, at 1298; see also Pildes, supra note 24, at 762 (arguing that
“[e]xpressive harms, no less than material harms to these kind of individual interests, ground
constitutional doctrine in many areas”).
281. Pildes, supra note 24, at 755.
282. Diamond & Koppelman, supra note 244, at 733.
283. Calabresi & Begley, supra note 260, at 702. Other scholars have made similar
arguments based on the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment. Orin Kerr, Is
There an Originalist Case for a Right to Same-Sex Marriage?, WASH. POST (Jan. 28, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/01/28/is-there-anoriginalist-case-for-a-right-to-same-sex-marriage/ [http://perma.cc/XGK6-Y29V] (reviewing
the arguments of various scholars for invalidating anti-marriage-equality laws based on
original understandings of the Fourteenth Amendment).
284. BARAK, supra note 47, at 17 (footnote omitted).
285. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 198 (1978).
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rhetoric of equal dignity, particularly in his series of gay-rights decisions, has
always been fundamentally rooted in the importance of fostering dialogue
among ordinary citizens.”286 Justice Kennedy once observed to an audience
of law students that “[j]udges are teachers. By our opinions, we teach.”287
Tribe believes that Justice Kennedy’s approach in Obergefell, particularly his
invocations of dignity, reflects his “view of the Court’s role in helping to
structure and stimulate public debate regarding the rights that should be
afforded to LGBT individuals and to same-sex couples, as well as the
evolving character of marriage as an institution.”288
It is not just their use of dignity in a vernacular idiom that makes the gay
and lesbian dignity decisions dialogic. It is also their portrayals of gays and
lesbians as real persons, and their candid descriptions of why and how antigay government discrimination had come to acquire the social meaning of
stigma and humiliation. In this way, the decisions provide a nice illustration
of Jack M. Balkin’s argument that “behind every constitutional interpretation
there lies a narrative, sometimes hidden and sometimes overt, a story about
how things came to be . . . things we still have to do, things that we learned
from past experience, things that we will never let happen again.”289
The focus on gays and lesbians as human beings worthy of dignity
becomes clearer with each decision, part of a dialogic evolution. In an earlier
gay-rights decision, Romer, the Court struck down a Colorado state
constitutional amendment that invalidated any state or local law that
protected gays and lesbians from discrimination and imposed onerous
political-process burdens to prevent future enactment or reenactment of such
laws. Romer did not invoke the dignity of gays and lesbians or speak about
them in a personalized way. It essentially spoke about them as a political
interest group.290
By contrast, Lawrence addressed gays and lesbians as human beings who
engage in intimate relationships—certainly a dramatic about-face from
Bowers only seventeen years earlier, which had painted the social meaning
of homosexuality as dark, if not menacing.291 According to Lawrence, gays
286. Tribe, Equal Dignity, supra note 13, at 23.
287. Id. at 23 n.57.
288. Id. at 24.
289. JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST
WORLD 3 (2011).
290. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (“Homosexuals are forbidden the
safeguards that others enjoy or may seek without constraint. They can obtain specific
protection against discrimination only by enlisting the citizenry of Colorado to amend the
State Constitution or . . . by trying to pass helpful laws of general applicability.”).
291. The Bowers majority opinion practically sneered that “[n]o connection between
family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other has
been demonstrated.” Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986), overruled by Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). If a state decided to criminalize gay sex based on nothing more
than its view that homosexuality was immoral, that, the Court said, was sufficient under the
Constitution. Id. at 196. Bowers also was notable for the marked homophobia of the
concurrence by Chief Justice Warren Burger. See id. at 196–97 (Burger, C.J., concurring)
(quoting Blackstone’s characterization of gay sex as “the infamous crime against nature” and
“an offense of ‘deeper malignity’ than rape”).
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and lesbians were entitled to make the same personal choices about sexuality
that were “central to personal dignity and autonomy”292 as heterosexuals, and
they were entitled to maintain sexual relationships “in the confines of their
homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free
persons,”293 a dignity that would be lost if such conduct could be
criminalized. Sodomy laws operated as “punishment and . . . state-sponsored
condemnation”294 by imposing “stigma” and carrying significant “imports
for the dignity of the persons charged.”295 They served only to “demean” the
“existence” of gays and lesbians.296 Such laws “control” the person’s
relationship choices and seek to “define the meaning of [a] relationship,”297
thereby costing gays and lesbians “their dignity as free persons.”298
Although the Court in Lawrence spoke of gay and lesbian sexuality in
terms of human relationships that were entitled to dignity, it said nothing
about the petitioners or their particular relationship. In Windsor, Justice
Kennedy’s majority opinion began with a warm and empathetic recounting
of the relationship between the respondent, Edith Windsor, and her wife,
Thea Spyer.299 Justice Kennedy described them as having “longed to
marry”300 and spoke approvingly of the social change that had led New York
to recognize their marriage.301 In electing to confer legal marriage on samesex couples, states were seeking to give same-sex couples “recognition,
dignity, and protection . . . in their own community,” not only with legally
defined sets of “incidents, benefits, and obligations,” but with a “status of
immense import.”302
The opinion then shifted tone to condemn the harm imposed by DOMA,
focusing on its social meaning and expressive effects. DOMA’s “avowed
purpose and practical effect” were to impose “a disadvantage,” “a separate
status,” and “a stigma”;303 to “disparage,” “humiliate,” and “injure.”304
DOMA tells same-sex couples “and all the world[] that their otherwise valid
marriages are unworthy of federal recognition.”305 It “instructs all federal
officials, and indeed all persons with whom same-sex couples interact,
including their own children, that their marriage is less worthy than the
marriages of others.”306

292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
Id. at 567.
Id. at 576.
Id. at 575.
Id. at 578.
Id. at 567.
Id.
See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2683, 2689 (2013).
Id. at 2689.
See infra notes 426–30 and accompanying text.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692.
Id. at 2693.
Id. at 2694, 2696.
Id. at 2694.
Id. at 2696.
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As Windsor had opened with sympathetic words about Windsor and Spyer,
Obergefell described the circumstances of plaintiffs from three of the
underlying cases to illustrate “the urgency of the petitioners’ cause.”307 The
descriptions are deeply respectful, emphasizing the plaintiffs’ earnest
struggles in the face of the indignities of state-sponsored discrimination.
The first plaintiff was James Obergefell himself, who was seeking not the
right to marry but merely the right to be listed as legal spouse on his recently
deceased husband’s death certificate.308 “By statute, they must remain
strangers even in death,” the Court observed, “a state-imposed separation
Obergefell deems ‘hurtful for the rest of time.’”309 The second set of
plaintiffs were a pair of nurses, April DeBoer and Jayne Rowse, who were
raising adopted children with serious health issues and sought “relief from
the continuing uncertainty their unmarried status creates in their lives” and
those of their children.310 The third set of plaintiffs were an Army Reserve
sergeant and his husband whose “lawful marriage is stripped from them
whenever they reside in Tennessee, returning and disappearing as they travel
across state lines.”311 The Court noted that the reservist, Ijpe DeKoe, had to
endure this “substantial burden” even though he had “served this Nation to
preserve the freedom the Constitution protects.”312
After recounting these human stories, the Court used plain, accessible
language to describe the social meaning of the state marriage bans as
dignitary harms—they “impose stigma and injury of the kind prohibited by
our basic charter.”313 When the opposition of legislators or citizens to samesex marriage “becomes enacted law and public policy, the necessary
consequence is to put the imprimatur of the State itself on an exclusion that
soon demeans or stigmatizes those whose own liberty is denied.”314 And
“[e]specially against a long history of disapproval of their relationships,” to
“impos[e] . . . this disability on gays and lesbians serves to disrespect and
subordinate them” and “works a grave and continuing harm.”315 Being
denied the benefits of marriage consigns same-sex couples “to an instability
many opposite-sex couples would deem intolerable in their own lives.”316
Exclusion from the right to marry “has the effect of teaching that gays and
lesbians are unequal in important respects.”317
A simple comparison will underscore this Article’s point about social
meaning and the Court’s vernacular use of dignity. In Obergefell, the Court
forcefully condemned the state marriage bans as demeaning, stigmatizing,
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Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594 (2015).
Id.
Id. at 2594–95 (quoting the record).
Id. at 2595.
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Id. at 2602.
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Id. at 2604.
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and a denial of dignity.318 Now, imagine if the Court had said the same thing
in the course of striking down bans on plural marriage. Obviously, such a
decision would have been met with outrage, disbelief, and resistance.
This comparison demonstrates why Chief Justice Roberts missed the point
when he claimed in his Obergefell dissent that “much of the majority’s
reasoning would apply with equal force to the claim of a fundamental right
to plural marriage” and that “[i]f a same-sex couple has the constitutional
right to marry because their children would otherwise ‘suffer the stigma of
knowing their families are somehow lesser,’ . . . why wouldn’t the same
reasoning apply to a family of three or more persons raising children?”319
The answer is that bans on plural marriage do not have the same negative,
invidious social meaning for most Americans as the bans on same-sex
marriage. A 2017 Gallup poll found that only 17 percent of Americans
thought polygamy was “morally acceptable.”320 The Court’s use of dignity
in the gay and lesbian cases referred not to an abstract legal right, but to
Americans’ evolved understanding about how their gay and lesbian fellow
citizens should be treated. Obergefell resonated with most Americans; a
decision striking down bans on plural marriage would not. As the
Washington Post noted in an article after Obergefell, polygamists seeking
legal recognition for a right to marry “will always be at a disadvantage
compared to the LGBT community” because “[u]nlike sexual orientation,
polygamy isn’t something most people will ever confront in their daily lives,
nor is [it] thought of as a trait someone is born with.”321 Leaving aside
whether it could be justified doctrinally, a decision striking down plural
marriage would have been a top-down imposition of judicial will.
Obergefell, with its dialogic pedigree and its reliance on social meaning, was
not.
D. Dignity and the “Democratic Process”
This Part concludes by briefly considering a separate but related dignity
issue: the dignitary harm imposed on a group when the ordinary political
process is unresponsive to its claims, even though those claims have majority
support. Sometimes, it turns out, courts are more responsive to public
preferences than bodies of elected representatives. This section primarily
focuses on Obergefell because most of the state marriage bans, unlike
sodomy laws or the federal DOMA, had been the subject of voter referenda,
and thus Obergefell raised the most salient concerns about the Court’s
relationship to the democratic process.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 2621–22 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 2600 (majority opinion)).
320. Andrew Dugan, Moral Acceptance of Polygamy at Record High—but Why?, GALLUP
(July 28, 2017), https://news.gallup.com/opinion/polling-matters/214601/moral-acceptancepolygamy-record-high-why.aspx [https://perma.cc/2872-3NHG].
321. Hunter Schwarz, Support for Polygamy Is Rising. But It’s Not the New Gay
Marriage., WASH. POST (July 2, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/
2015/07/02/support-for-polygamy-is-rising-but-its-not-the-new-gay-marriage/
[https://perma.cc/HA2F-ZUDH].
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Critics of the Court’s gay and lesbian dignity decisions have accused the
Court of “judicial hubris”322 (Lawrence) and misusing its power to “put fear
into the hearts of anyone who does not share the belief that homosexuality is
morally neutral, or morally good” (Windsor).323 Opponents of Obergefell
have insisted that the decision, in the words of one religious-conservative
activist, “usurped the authority of the people, working through the
democratic process, to define marriage.”324
This line of criticism also was a core theme in the Obergefell dissents.
Chief Justice Roberts said Americans were “in the midst of a serious and
thoughtful public debate on the issue of same-sex marriage”325 and that
change on such a matter should only come through the “democratic
process.”326 Justice Scalia scorched the majority for perpetrating a “judicial
Putsch” through “a naked judicial claim to legislative—indeed, superlegislative—power.”327 The court below in Obergefell, in holding that state
marriage bans did not violate the Constitution, also cast much of its opinion
as a homily about the virtues of leaving decisions on a controversial question
like same-sex marriage to “state democratic processes.”328
It is necessary to untangle two different issues in the criticism of
Obergefell: the argument implied by some of its critics that it was
countermajoritarian,329 and the complaint that, whatever the public’s views,
the Court had usurped a question that should, as a matter of principle, be left
to political decision-making.330
The first criticism is plainly incorrect. “The majority of the [C]ourt has
simply replaced the people’s opinion about what marriage is with its own,”
wrote one critic.331 But as I have already demonstrated, the Court did no
such thing. Its decision in Obergefell (as with Lawrence and Windsor), was
consistent with solid and growing majority opinion among Americans, in this
case about the legality of same-sex marriage.332 One might still object, as a
matter of respect for federalism, that marriage equality did not enjoy majority
support in every state. But considering the steady upward trend of support
for same-sex marriage among Americans in the aggregate—60 percent and

322. Lund & McGinnis, supra note 34.
323. Rod Dreher, Scalia:
“Open Season on Marriage Traditionalists,” AM.
CONSERVATIVE (June 26, 2013), https://www.theamericanconservative.com/dreher/scaliadoma-open-season/ [https://perma.cc/HMU4-PZVF].
324. RYAN T. ANDERSON, TRUTH OVERRULED: THE FUTURE OF MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM 1 (2015).
325. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2624 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
326. Id. at 2622.
327. Id. at 2629 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
328. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 396 (6th Cir. 2014), rev’d, Obergefell v. Hodges,
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
329. See, e.g., Buss, supra note 34, at 25 (criticizing Obergefell as “the work of a partisan
elite imposing its policy preferences on the American people”).
330. See supra notes 324–26.
331. ANDERSON, supra note 324, at 60.
332. See supra note 37. See generally supra Part II.
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growing at the time of the decision333—Obergefell plainly was not
countermajoritarian.
The other criticism goes to the Court’s role vis-à-vis the process of
democratic decision-making. It is about who should decide: the courts or
the people. The Obergefell majority opinion addressed that criticism with
the principle that “fundamental rights” like marriage “may not be submitted
to a vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.”334 Those who deny
that same-sex marriage should be encompassed within this fundamental right
will not be satisfied by that answer. But consider another justification for the
Court’s intervention: the fact that many of the state marriage bans were
themselves countermajoritarian—indeed, they had been intentionally
designed to be virtually immune to change through the ordinary democratic
process.
As previously discussed by this author at greater length elsewhere,335 the
majority of the state marriage bans enacted between the 1990s and 2012 were
in the form of state constitutional amendments. Whereas ordinary laws can
be changed by simple legislative majorities responding to changes in their
constituents’ policy preferences, these amendments were “intended to freeze
marriage discrimination in place and put it beyond the reach of ordinary
democratic deliberation, future legislative reconsideration, and state judicial
review.”336
The result was that although attitudes rapidly evolved, state laws did not.
In March 2014, thirty-three states prohibited same-sex marriage, yet in those
states collectively, the public supported marriage equality by a margin of 53
to 40 percent.337 The four states whose laws were before the Court in
Obergefell—Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee—all banned samesex marriage by state constitutional amendment. By early 2015, a few
months before Obergefell, popular majorities in Michigan and Ohio favored
marriage equality.338 In Kentucky and Tennessee, support for same-sex
marriage had been rising at an estimated rate of more than 2 percent per year
as of 2012.339 Yet, had proponents in any of those states managed to
333. Gay and Lesbian Rights, supra note 37.
334. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2606 (2015) (quoting W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)).
335. Steve Sanders, Mini-DOMAS as Political Process Failures: The Case for Heightened
Scrutiny of State Anti-Gay Marriage Amendments, 109 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 12 (2014).
336. Id. at 14.
337. Peyton M. Craighill & Scott Clement, Support for Same-Sex Marriage Hits New High;
Half Say Constitution Guarantees Right, WASH. POST (Mar. 4, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ politics/support-for-same-sexmarriage-hits-new-high-halfsay-constitution-guarantees-right/2014/03/04/f737e87e-a3e5-11e3-a5fa-55f0c77bf39c
_story.html [https://perma.cc/ALU2-TWAM].
338. Joanna Piacenza, State of the States on Same-Sex Marriage, PUB. RELIGION RES. INST.
(Feb.
11,
2015),
https://www.prri.org/spotlight/state-of-the-states-on-gay-marriage/
[https://perma.cc/G33P-5BG7].
339. Joshua Tucker, If Same-Sex Marriage Is So Popular, Why Does It Always Lose at the
Ballot Box?, MONKEY CAGE (May 15, 2012), http://themonkeycage.org/2012/05/if-same-sexmarriage-is-so-popular-why-does-it-always-lose-at-the-ballot-box-includes-state-level-dataon-support-and-legislation/ [https://perma.cc/Q8K5-FLSZ].
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persuade their state legislatures and governors to support marriage equality,
nothing would have happened. Even when a social group enjoys emerging
support for its claims about legal rights, the group may not have the resources
and political muscle that are necessary to defeat or reverse a constitutional
amendment. The large number of successful mini-DOMA campaigns—no
mini-DOMA proposal was ever defeated until 2012340—underscores this
point.
Some commentators, even if they endorse the idea of a Constitution that
evolves alongside national values, argue that patterns of enacted state laws
are a better barometer of national values than public opinion surveys or
“more general evidence of an American societal consensus.”341 But what
happens when ordinary state lawmaking processes are systematically
unresponsive to public preferences? Under most versions of democratic
theory, a well-functioning democracy “requires some minimal matching of
government choice to citizen preference.”342 Yet, that often fails to happen
for a variety of reasons.343 One reason is interest group capture. A 2009
study by two political scientists of state policies affecting gays and lesbians
found that on questions of gay rights, the preferences of “[p]owerful
conservative religious interest groups” usually were “overrepresented,”
which resulted in policies that were sometimes incongruent with overall
public attitudes.344
The phenomenon of courts sometimes vindicating majority preferences
when representative institutions fail to do so has become so familiar that one
commentator has labeled it “upside-down judicial review.”345 Sometimes,
writes Corinna Barrett Lain, “[t]he branches most majoritarian in theory are
least majoritarian in practice, and vice versa” and “a Supreme Court ruling
may just look countermajoritarian because the base line against which it is
judged—the ostensibly majoritarian stance of the legislative and executive
branches—is not majoritarian after all. Sometimes in a representative
democracy, the representative branches aren’t.”346 Other scholars have
explored this same phenomenon.347

340. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
341. See, e.g., Conkle, Three Theories, supra note 45, at 135.
342. Jeffrey R. Lax & Justin H. Phillips, Gay Rights in the States: Public Opinion and
Policy Responsiveness, 103 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 367, 367 (2009).
343. THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT 5 (1989)
(criticizing the “assumption that the policies of the popularly elected branches necessarily
represent a nationwide public opinion majority”).
344. Lax & Phillips, supra note 342, at 383.
345. See generally Corinna Barrett Lain, Upside-Down Judicial Review, 101 GEO. L.J. 113
(2012).
346. Id. at 116 (footnote omitted).
347. See, e.g., JEFFREY ROSEN, THE MOST DEMOCRATIC BRANCH: HOW THE COURTS SERVE
AMERICA 4 (2006) (“How did we get to this odd moment in American history where unelected
Supreme Court justices sometimes express the views of popular majorities more faithfully
than the people’s elected representatives?”); Strauss, supra note 207, at 861 (arguing that an
appropriate function of judicial review is to invalidate “laws that would not be enacted today
or that will soon lose popular support”).

2112

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

A full discussion of how and why lawmakers sometimes fail to give
Americans the policies they want is beyond the scope of this Article and is
the subject of a large literature in public-choice theory. But the topic
deserves some attention here because it responds to criticisms that Obergefell
inappropriately cut short the operation of the democratic process around
marriage equality,348 it provides an additional perspective on the potential
merits of dialogic judicial review, and it highlights an additional dignity
issue—the indignity that comes when the democratic process is unresponsive
to a minority group’s claims and when it has been engineered through
political mechanisms like constitutional amendments to remain
unresponsive.
In sum, Lawrence, Windsor, and Obergefell are properly understood as
dialogic because their holdings—invalidating sodomy laws, DOMA, and
state marriage bans—squarely confronted the demeaning and stigmatizing
social meaning of these laws, social meaning that was informed by public
attitudes, social-movement activism, and other developments in
constitutional culture. Rapid and inexorable change in the direction of
greater personal and civic dignity for gays and lesbians made it possible for
the Supreme Court to interpret and help construct the changing social
meaning of sodomy laws and marriage restrictions, confident that Americans
would accept its characterization of these laws as dignitary harms that were
incompatible with constitutional norms of equality and liberty. Each
decision built upon the one before, and the Court’s rulings also helped to
inform public attitudes. Through these decisions, the Court was bringing
constitutional law into alignment with the “considered judgment of the
American people.”349 But the Constitution did not change in its fundamental
principles. The Court used “dignity” in a way that bridged its legal and
vernacular meanings and that advanced a principle that is well-established
under constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process: that
government may not demean and impose stigma on certain groups through
class legislation. Obergefell, in particular, illustrates how the dialogic
process of judicial review can respond to public preferences in a way the
ordinary democratic process may not.
V. THE DIGNITY DECISIONS AS MODELS OF DIALOGUE
The previous Part demonstrated how dialogic judicial review in the gay
and lesbian dignity cases was driven by the Court’s awareness and
articulation of the changing social meaning of government anti-gay
discrimination. This Part expands upon that discussion to explain how these
cases fit well within the dialogic model of judicial review in more general
ways: the decisions accurately captured majority attitudes, contributed to the
advancement of changes in law and public attitudes, and forthrightly
348. It also helps rebut what Carlos A. Ball has called the “revisionist and sanitized version
of the same-sex marriage debates” provided by the Obergefell dissents. Ball, supra note 237,
at 654.
349. FRIEDMAN, supra note 21, at 14.
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embraced social and cultural change while articulating an evolving
conception of constitutional equal protection and due process.
A. The Decisions Reflected Majority Preferences
At the most basic level, dialogic judicial review is premised on the idea
that when the people speak, the Court listens.350 It follows that one way we
can know that a decision is consistent with this dialogic process is if it is
supported by a stable majority of the people at the time or if it accurately
anticipates the clear direction in which public attitudes are moving.
“Majoritarian” is not the same thing as “dialogic,”351 but a decision cannot
be said to reflect the “will of the people” if it does not at least eventually
come to command majority assent.
There is room for debate about how large the majority support for a
decision should be under the dialogic model—is 51 percent enough? Sixty?
Eighty? It is possible to argue that constitutional law should only be based
on something closer to a “consensus” than a majority.352 Bickel referred to
a standard of “general assent.”353 Setting aside the difficulty of defining
“consensus” or “general assent,” that question is beyond the scope of this
Article because it goes to a related but separate question: the democratic
legitimacy of any particular decision. Dialogic judicial review is not a
standard—it is a process. It is possible to conclude that the Court is listening
and interacting with the public but that it still disagrees about how strong
public sentiment should be before a decision becomes legitimate
“constitutional authority.”354
The data and discussion presented in Part II demonstrate that Lawrence,
Windsor, and Obergefell were all majoritarian decisions in that their holdings
produced results—eliminating the criminalization of gay sex, invalidating
DOMA, and removing state-imposed impediments to legal same-sex
marriage—that were consistent with the policy preferences of growing
majorities.355 At the time of Lawrence, 59 percent of Americans agreed that
“gay or lesbian relations between consenting adults” should be legal, up from
33 percent in 1986.356 The number rose to 72 percent by 2017.357 At the
time of Windsor, strong majorities opposed DOMA’s policy of
nonrecognition of valid same-sex marriages.358 At the time of Obergefell,

350. Bednar, supra note 169, at 1179 (“According to [Barry Friedman’s] thesis, the Court
and the public not only speak to one another, they listen to each other, with the Court deferring
to the public when they disagree.”).
351. See supra notes 177–84 and accompanying text.
352. See Primus, supra note 169, at 1218.
353. BICKEL, supra note 185, at 239.
354. Primus, supra note 169, at 1219.
355. See supra Part II.
356. Gay and Lesbian Rights, supra note 37.
357. Id.
358. See supra notes 140–44 and accompanying text.
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60 percent said same-sex marriage should be legal, up from 27 percent in
1996.359 The number would rise to 67 percent in 2018.360
Perhaps the best evidence that the Court correctly read and described the
nation’s understanding of the social meaning of the laws in these cases was
the lack of any significant backlash. To be sure, the decisions have been
criticized as unconventional in their legal reasoning,361 and some
commentators have attempted to create a misleading narrative of the Court
substituting its judgment for that of the people.362 But it is obvious that most
of the public accepted them.
For example, Lawrence, although momentous in its meaning for the
equality and dignity of gays and lesbians, was not controversial. Shortly after
the decision, conservative legal scholars Nelson Lund and John O. McGinnis
observed that, compared to an enduringly controversial decision like Roe v.
Wade, “[o]ne can hardly foresee a similar passion for overturning a judicial
decision that merely eliminates a few haphazard prosecutions for private
conduct that has no immediate effect on any third parties.”363 Lund and
McGinnis correctly predicted that “most of the public can be counted on to
respond to the immediate consequences of Lawrence with a yawn.”364
Similarly, Windsor provoked little negative reaction—again, not
surprising, since a majority of Americans at the time of the decision already
opposed DOMA and supported marriage equality.365 Immediately following
the decision, Time reported that the ruling was consistent with “public
opinion trends. The most recent polls suggest about 58% of Americans want
to legalize gay marriage. That marks a huge swing over the last few
decades.”366 The same article also noted that, on the day of the decision, “[i]f
you type the word ‘gay’ into Google, your search box turns rainbow.”367 The
New York Times observed that Windsor showed “just how rapidly much of
the country had moved beyond the [C]ourt.”368 A decision that “just three
years ago would have loomed as polarizing and even stunning instead served
359. Gay and Lesbian Rights, supra note 37.
360. Id.
361. See, e.g., Lund & McGinnis, supra note 34, at 1557 (calling the Lawrence majority
opinion “a tissue of sophistries embroidered with a bit of sophomoric philosophizing”);
Andrew Koppelman, The Supreme Court Made the Right Call on Marriage Equality—but
They Did It the Wrong Way, SALON (June 29, 2015, 7:15 PM), https://www.salon.com/
2015/06/29/the_supreme_court_made_the_right_call_on_marriage_equality_%E2%80%94_
but_they_did_it_the_wrong_way/ [https://perma.cc/6JZC-STCH] (criticizing Obergefell for
its “remarkably weak reasoning”).
362. See supra notes 329–34 and accompanying text.
363. Lund & McGinnis, supra note 34, at 1556.
364. Id.
365. See supra notes 140–44 and accompanying text.
366. Dave Pell, Next Draft: Everybody Must Get Stonewalled, TIME (June 26, 2013),
http://newsfeed.time.com/2013/06/26/how-the-supreme-courts-doma-ruling-reflects-publicopinion/ [https://perma.cc/AQS4-RSYF].
367. Id.
368. Adam Nagourney, Court Follows Nation’s Lead, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/27/us/politics/with-gay-marriage-a-tide-of-public-opinionthat-swept-past-the-court.html [https://perma.cc/YZ37-JNLZ].
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to underscore and ratify vast political changes that have taken place across
much of the country.”369 In contrast to the widespread negative attitudes
toward homosexuality only a few decades earlier, by 2013
[w]ord that a celebrity wants to marry someone of the same sex, whether
Neil Patrick Harris or Ellen DeGeneres, is treated as celebratory news in
People magazine rather than scandalous in The National Enquirer. And as
the court surely noted in its deliberations, public sentiment on the issue has
flipped.370

These observations were confirmed by the public acceptance two years
later of the Obergefell decision and the lack of significant backlash to the
legalization of same-sex marriage nationwide. The acceptance of Obergefell
was all the more remarkable given the intense backlash that the marriage
equality movement had encountered between the mid-1990s and the late
2000s.371 A CNN poll immediately following the decision found that
63 percent of Americans approved of Obergefell.372 One journalist who
chronicled the history of the marriage equality movement observed that
“[t]he country got out ahead of the Supreme Court so that the Supreme Court
only seemed to be ratifying public opinion that was already there.”373
Support for same-sex marriage in general continued its steady upward
trajectory after the decision and reached 64 percent in 2017.374
Efforts by same-sex marriage opponents to organize backlash against
Obergefell mostly flopped. Any negative reaction discernible to the general
public was limited to a few high-profile incidents of disobedience by civil
servants such as Kentucky County Clerk Kim Davis375—disobedience that
most Americans found unjustified.376 Claims for religious exemptions from
civil rights laws protecting gays and lesbians seeking wedding-related
products and services generally have failed in the courts. Alabama Chief
Justice Roy Moore was suspended by the state’s Court of the Judiciary for
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. See supra notes 125–36 and accompanying text.
372. Jennifer Agiesta, Poll: Majorities Back Supreme Court Rulings on Marriage,
Obamacare, CNN (June 30, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/30/politics/supreme-courtgay-marriage-obamacare-poll/index.html [https://perma.cc/FV8S-UJBR].
373. John King, How Did the Same-Sex Marriage Revolution Sweep the Nation So
Quickly?, CNN (June 30, 2015, 3:05 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2015/06/28/politics/insidepolitics-same-sex-marriage-revolution/index.html [https://perma.cc/7CG6-QNJD] (quoting
journalist Molly Ball).
374. Gay and Lesbian Rights, supra note 37.
375. Alan Blinder & Tamar Lewin, Clerk in Kentucky Chooses Jail over Deal on SameSex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/04/us/kimdavis-same-sex-marriage.html [https://perma.cc/FH8T-FRNV].
376. See, e.g., Peyton M. Craighill & Sandhya Somashekhar, Post-ABC Poll: Most Say
Kim Davis Should Issue Marriage Licenses to Gay Couples, WASH. POST (Sept. 15, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/poll-most-say-kim-davis-should-issue-marriagelicenses-to-gay-couples/2015/09/14/684e6d62-5b0a-11e5-b38e-06883aacba64_story.html
[https://perma.cc/3RTY-F4J6] (reporting that “[n]early three-quarters of those surveyed say it
is more important to treat everyone equally than to accommodate someone’s religious beliefs
when the two principles conflict” and that 45 percent supported jailing Davis for contempt of
court).
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ordering the state’s probate judges to defy federal orders issued pursuant to
Obergefell.377 Two years after Obergefell, political scientists Kimberly
Martin and Chris Tecklenburg cataloged 147 “backlash” bills introduced in
state legislatures in reaction to Obergefell, mostly measures that were
described as protecting, in one way or another, the religious liberty of samesex marriage opponents.378 Only nine of these were enacted, and most did
not even get a hearing.379
B. The Decisions Contributed to a Dynamic Process of
Attitudinal Change and Legal Innovation
Although dialogic judicial review implies that a decision will be supported
by a stable majority of the people at the time or accurately anticipates the
clear direction in which public attitudes are moving, dialogic judicial review
is not just a matter of the Court’s decisions aligning with majoritarian
preferences. It is a continuing conversation. In an area where there is
ongoing litigation (as with gay and lesbian rights), decisions often build on
one another: the Court’s decisions may be final in a legal sense as to the
question they decide, but they are also part of a constitutional culture that
remains dynamic.380 Because the process “moves in fits and starts and along
several tracks at once . . . it is ungainly and difficult to model.”381 But the
public, social movements, courts, and politics all play a role in shaping the
constitutional culture that informs the Court’s decisions,382 and these
decisions in turn provoke further consideration and debate.383
The gay and lesbian dignity trilogy followed this model. Lawrence first
introduced the ideas of dignity and concern for stigmatic harm against gays
and lesbians that would be at the center of Windsor and Obergefell.384
Lawrence also ruled out morality as a sufficient purpose for discriminatory
laws when it was unaccompanied by any concrete objective harm.385 But the
377. Kent Faulk, Alabama Supreme Court Chief Justice Roy Moore Suspended for Rest of
Term, AL.COM (Sept. 30, 2016), https://www.al.com/news/birmingham/2016/09/
alabama_supreme_court_chief_ju.html [https://perma.cc/ZJ5K-LR9X].
378. These data appeared in a paper presented at the 2017 annual meeting of the American
Political Science Association, which is on file with the author of this Article.
379. See supra note 378.
380. Post, supra note 33, at 83 (observing that because constitutional law does not exist
independent of culture, “constitutional law properly evolves as culture evolves,” and because
“culture is always dynamic and contested, constitutional law will necessarily also be dynamic
and contested”).
381. Friedman, supra note 19, at 1236 (footnotes omitted).
382. Siegel, supra note 23, at 1350 (defining constitutional culture as including “the
institutions in which members of the polity argue over the Constitution’s meaning—including
institutions of civil society, the political and juridical dimensions of federated government,
and much more”).
383. Friedman, supra note 19, at 1236 (arguing that “judicial meanings shift in response to
changing public understandings, and judicial decisions provoke the public to consider what
the Constitution ought to mean”).
384. See supra notes 292–98 and accompanying text.
385. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003) (observing that a political majority may
not “use the power of the State to enforce . . . [moral] views on the whole society through
operation of the criminal law”).
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effects of Lawrence on both law and culture could not have been foreseen at
the time. Writing in the decision’s immediate wake, Robert Post
characterized it as “the opening bid in a conversation that the Court expects
to hold with the American public.”386 Although Lawrence “advanced a
powerful and passionate statement that is plainly designed to influence the
ongoing national debate about the constitutional status of homosexuality,”
Post believed that the Court had not yet “committed itself to the full
consequences of its position. It has crafted its opinion so as to allow itself
flexibly to respond to the unfolding nature of public discussion.”387 The legal
principles articulated in Lawrence would be clarified by the Court “in the
context of changes in constitutional culture produced by the popular debate
provoked by Lawrence.”388
Similarly, David Strauss characterized Lawrence as an example of the
“modernizing mission” of judicial review.389 Criminalizing gay sex had
“little support in current sentiment.”390 Yet, by leaving other issues about
gays and lesbians undecided and expressly disclaiming any notion that it was
deciding the issue of marriage, the Court “left the door open for the political
branches to tell it that popular sentiment will not support any extension of
Lawrence.”391
Nonetheless, Lawrence’s impact quickly became apparent. It was cited a
few months later by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in the first
court decision legalizing same-sex marriage in any state.392 It was also cited
by the Iowa Supreme Court, in the second such state judicial decision, for the
principle that the meanings of constitutional guarantees evolve with the
times.393 Back in the U.S. Supreme Court, Lawrence was cited in Windsor
for the principle that the Constitution protects the “moral and sexual choices”
of same-sex couples.394 And Lawrence was cited in Obergefell for the
principle that “[h]istory and tradition guide and discipline” constitutional
analysis “but do not set its outer boundaries,” a flexibility that “respects our
history and learns from it without allowing the past alone to rule the
present.”395
Dialogic judicial review also implies that the Court is sensitive to just how
much leeway it has with the public. On the same day it struck down the
federal DOMA in Windsor in 2013, it declined to take the more dramatic step
in Hollingsworth v. Perry396 of declaring state anti-gay marriage laws
unconstitutional. It avoided the question on jurisdictional grounds.
Nonetheless, the effect was to allow a district court decision striking down
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
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California’s Proposition 8 to go into effect, thus legalizing marriage equality
in the nation’s most populous state. This prudent, one-step-at-time approach
also was consistent with dialogic judicial review. DOMA had long been
unpopular—even its leading congressional sponsor had repudiated it397—but
most states still outlawed same-sex marriage, and federal courts applying the
federal Constitution had only recently begun adjudicating challenges to state
marriage laws.
Yet, legalizing same-sex marriage in the nation’s largest state would
further normalize marriage equality and contribute to its increased public
acceptance. Political science research suggests that a minority group’s legal
and political advancements can affect perceived social norms and lead to
more positive public attitudes (or at least fewer negative attitudes) toward the
group.398 “Institutional decisions in particular reinforce the idea that
society’s norms are trending in a certain direction and indicate to many
people that a norm is on the right side of history, that it will be viewed
favorably in the future.”399 And, of course, more positive public attitudes
help make possible further legal and political innovation.
Windsor—with its admonitions about “disadvantage,” “separate status,”
and “stigma”—triggered an uptick in the pace of marriage litigation in the
federal courts and provided something of a guide to arguments that could be
made against the state marriage bans as well. The result was that “the rich
debate among the American people on the issue of same-sex marriage . . .
continued to occur through the federal litigation in the district courts.”400 As
Emily Buss has written:
While the federal district judges shifted the analysis to federal law, they did
so in a role firmly grounded in local politics and culture. In an area of law
in which popular attitudes were shifting, not only about whether same-sex
marriage should be permitted, but also whether it should be understood as
a civil right, the federal district judges played an important role as stateaffiliated interpreters of the federal Constitution.401

By the time the question of state same-sex marriage laws finally reached
the Supreme Court in Obergefell, public support for marriage equality had
risen to 60 percent, having steadily increased from 27 percent in 1996, to 42
percent in 2004 (the year after Lawrence), to 54 percent the month after
Windsor.402 Support continued to increase after Obergefell,403 as did

397. Barr, supra note 129.
398. Andrew R. Flores & Scott Barclay, Backlash, Consensus, Legitimacy, or Polarization:
The Effect of Same-Sex Marriage Policy on Mass Attitudes, 69 POL. RES. Q. 43, 52 (2016).
399. Supreme Court Ruling on Gay Marriage Changed Perception of Norms, Despite
Stable Personal Beliefs, ASS’N FOR PSYCHOL. SCI. (Aug. 10, 2017),
https://www.psychologicalscience.org/publications/observer/obsonline/supreme-courtruling-on-gay-marriage-changed-perception-of-norms-despite-stable-personal-beliefs.html
[https://perma.cc/7UVS-46GH].
400. Buss, supra note 34, at 59.
401. Id. at 38.
402. Gay and Lesbian Rights, supra note 37.
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Americans’ perceptions about social norms (that is, what they believe other
people think) concerning same-sex marriage.404
C. The Decisions Expressly Embraced Social and Cultural Change
Dialogic judicial review is premised on the idea that “judicial decisions
and public understandings swim in a current together and influence one
another.”405 To an extent that has been underappreciated in other
commentary about these decisions, the Court in the gay and lesbian dignity
cases acknowledged—and signaled its approval toward—the changes in
public understanding and American culture described in Part II.406 To be
sure, the Court did not expressly characterize its decisions as mere responses
to social change. But its awareness of how the nation’s attitudes toward gays
and lesbians had rapidly evolved—and were continuing to do so—is
unmistakable, and this awareness contributes to the narrative of the Court’s
reasoning in each decision.
Lawrence characterized the invalidation of sodomy laws as a product of
“emerging awareness” about sexual autonomy in general and the sexual
choices of gays and lesbians in particular.407 Emphasizing the relevance of
“our laws and traditions in the past half century,”408 the Court documented
the downfall of sodomy laws that began in 1955 with the Model Penal Code
and continued through the post-Bowers period, in which six more states got
rid of their own sodomy laws through state judicial decision or legislative
action.409 The Court confessed its own error in Bowers in “fail[ing] to
appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake”410 and failing to understand the
“emerging recognition” that “liberty gives substantial protection to adult
persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining
to sex.”411
Lawrence implicitly rejected the static “history and tradition” approach to
substantive due process of Washington v. Glucksberg.412 Instead, Lawrence
underscored that constitutional protections evolve alongside social change:
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of
liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific.
They did not presume to have this insight. They knew times can blind us
to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought
necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution
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endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own
search for greater freedom.413

The distance that both the nation and the Court had traveled in their
attitudes toward gays and lesbians and their relationships was reflected by
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor—a justice who was so often seen as a
barometer of moderation and of the legal and political mainstream414—in her
Lawrence concurrence.415 Justice O’Connor had joined the majority opinion
in Bowers, whose language conveyed a harsh and dismissive attitude toward
homosexuals.416 In Lawrence, Justice O’Connor disagreed with the
majority’s use of substantive due process as the basis for invalidating the
Texas sodomy law.417 She would have upheld sodomy laws that applied to
everyone but used the Equal Protection Clause to invalidate those like
Texas’s that only targeted gays and lesbians.418 But her opinion
demonstrated a far different understanding of homosexuality and anti-gay
government discrimination than the Bowers court.
Justice O’Connor acknowledged that sodomy laws “inhibit[] personal
relationships.”419 She also agreed that the Texas law “makes homosexuals
unequal in the eyes of the law by making particular conduct—and only that
conduct—subject to criminal sanction”420 and that the consequences of a
conviction under the law were serious: “Texas’ sodomy law brands all
homosexuals as criminals, thereby making it more difficult for homosexuals
to be treated in the same manner as everyone else.”421
Justice O’Connor maintained that “Bowers did not hold that moral
disapproval of a group is a rational basis under the Equal Protection Clause
to criminalize homosexual sodomy when heterosexual sodomy is not
punished.”422 This is a questionable reading. Although the Georgia sodomy
law was not limited to homosexuals, the Court made clear its view that “the
presumed belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual
sodomy is immoral and unacceptable” was a sufficient rational basis to
uphold the law.423 At any rate, by 2003, Justice O’Connor had come to
413. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578–79.
414. See, e.g., Marci Hamilton, The Remarkable Legacy of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor,
FINDLAW (July 14, 2005), http://supreme.findlaw.com/legal-commentary/the-remarkablelegacy-of-justice-sandra-day-oconnor.html [https://perma.cc/E6MQ-SKQF] (commenting on
Justice O’Connor’s frequent role as a swing vote and observing that “[s]he—consistent, wise,
and prudent—has remained in the reasonable, moderate position she had staked out, even as
others have tried to polarize the Court”).
415. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
416. See supra note 291.
417. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
418. Id.
419. Id. at 580.
420. Id. at 581.
421. Id.
422. Id. at 582.
423. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (“[R]espondent . . . insists that
majority sentiments about the morality of homosexuality should be declared inadequate. We
do not agree, and are unpersuaded that the sodomy laws of some 25 States should be
invalidated on this basis.”), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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believe that “[a] law branding one class of persons as criminal based solely
on the State’s moral disapproval of that class and the conduct associated with
that class runs contrary to the values of the Constitution and the Equal
Protection Clause, under any standard of review.”424
While Lawrence spoke to social change mostly by discussing legal reform
in the United States and other countries,425 not public attitudes, Windsor
spoke freely and approvingly about the direction in which American society
was moving on same-sex marriage. The Court positioned itself as protector
of the states that had decided to extend marriage equality to gays and lesbians
against the interference of a hostile Congress. The decision by some states,
including Edith Windsor’s home state of New York, to extend marriage to
gay and lesbian couples reflected “the community’s . . . evolving
understanding of the meaning of equality.”426 The dawning of legal samesex marriage beginning in 2004 was made possible by “the beginnings of a
new perspective, a new insight.”427 The exclusion of gays and lesbians from
marriage “came to be seen in New York and certain other States as an unjust
exclusion.”428 When New York legalized same-sex marriage, it was moving
“to correct what its citizens and elected representatives perceived to be an
injustice that they had not earlier known or understood.”429 The state was
“responding ‘to the initiative of those who [sought] a voice in shaping the
destiny of their own times.’”430
Obergefell similarly spoke approvingly about evolving public attitudes
and developments in the larger culture and did even more to characterize the
national debate over same-sex marriage as an ongoing dialogue involving the
public, lawmaking, and the courts. These observations about dialogue, social
change, and the evolving meaning of constitutional guarantees serve not just
as background facts or dicta. They are integral to the majority’s reasoning
about why the constitutional right to marry should be extended to same-sex
couples and why their exclusion from marriage was a dignitary harm.
Obergefell begins by observing that the history of marriage itself “is one
of both continuity and change” and that marriage is an institution that “has
evolved over time.”431 The Court then ties this phenomenon of cultural
change directly to both the lawmaking process and judicial review: the
changed understandings about marriage “are characteristic of a Nation where
new dimensions of freedom become apparent to new generations, often
through perspectives that begin in pleas or protests and then are considered
in the political sphere and the judicial process.”432
424. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 585 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
425. See id. at 576–77.
426. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692–93 (2013).
427. Id. at 2689.
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. Id. at 2692 (alteration in original) (quoting Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 221
(2011)).
431. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2595 (2015).
432. Id. at 2596.
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The Court provides an extended and sympathetic discussion of the history
of “the Nation’s experiences with the rights of gays and lesbians,”433 one that
underscores the idea of an ongoing dialogue between courts and culture.
Until the mid-twentieth century, gays and their intimacies were condemned
and criminalized: “many persons did not deem homosexuals to have dignity
in their own distinct identity,” and “the argument that gays and lesbians had
a just claim to dignity was in conflict with both law and widespread social
conventions.”434 But “[i]n the late twentieth century, following substantial
cultural and political developments, same-sex couples began to lead more
open and public lives and to establish families.”435 There followed “a quite
extensive discussion of the issue in both governmental and private sectors
and by a shift in public attitudes toward greater tolerance.”436
Soon, gay rights questions “reached the courts, where the issue could be
discussed in the formal discourse of the law.”437 Despite the passage of
DOMA in 1996, a “new and widespread discussion” of marriage equality led
some states to legalize same-sex marriage beginning in 2003 through
legislative action or state judicial decisions.438 By the time the question
reached the Court a little more than a decade later, there had been “referenda,
legislative debates, and grassroots campaigns . . .[,] countless studies, papers,
books, and other popular and scholarly writings,” as well as “extensive
litigation in state and federal courts.”439 Federal and state judicial opinions
addressing marriage equality—of which there had been ninety-five by the
time of Obergefell440—reflected “the more general, societal discussion of
same-sex marriage and its meaning that has occurred over the past
decades.”441
While Obergefell notes the state and federal litigation over marriage
equality that had been unfolding for more than a decade, the opinion is
striking for its lack of reference to amicus briefs, expert testimony in the
lower courts, or similar authorities. It is as though the Court had so
internalized the forces of social and attitudinal change, and the political and
legal discourses that had accompanied it, that these became an organic part
of its decision.
Acknowledging that in 1972 it had dismissed a same-sex marriage case
with a one-line summary disposition because it did not present “a substantial
federal question,”442 the Court confessed in Obergefell that it, “like many
institutions, has made assumptions defined by the world and time of which it
is a part.”443 In interpreting the meaning of constitutional guarantees, “the
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Court has recognized that new insights and societal understandings can
reveal unjustified inequality within our most fundamental institutions that
once passed unnoticed and unchallenged.”444
Finally, Obergefell expressly invokes principles of a living Constitution.
The Court describes the Constitution as “a charter protecting the right of all
persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning,” one that is open to “new
insight [that] reveals discord between the Constitution’s central protections
and a received legal stricture.”445 Constitutional rights “come not from
ancient sources alone” but “from a better informed understanding” of
liberty’s contemporary meaning.446
CONCLUSION
The nation’s evolution—more accurately, revolution—in attitudes toward
gays and lesbians contributed directly to a series of landmark decisions, one
building upon the other, in which the Supreme Court expanded the meaning
of the Constitution’s guarantees of equality and liberty. The guiding
principle of “dignity” provided harmony and discipline across these
decisions. Lawrence, Windsor, and Obergefell are best understood as a
trilogy which provides insight into how the Supreme Court listens to the
public, interprets the nation’s constitutional culture, and moves constitutional
law forward in a way that remains sensitive and responsive to “the will of the
people.”
This Article has sought to illuminate one particularly dramatic and
innovative example of dialogic judicial review, but in doing so, it suggests
important questions for the ongoing scholarly dialogue about judicial review
and the role of a constitutional court in a democratic society. Do we
necessarily want constitutional law to be “majoritarian”? If so, how big, or
how enduring, should the majority be in order to qualify as constitutional
authority? Should we trust the Supreme Court to interpret public attitudes
and construct social meaning? How does dialogic judicial review relate to
more conventional tests and modes of constitutional analysis that lower
courts must apply to questions of equality and liberty?
Justice Felix Frankfurter famously observed that “[i]t is an inadmissibly
narrow conception of American constitutional law to confine it to the words
of the Constitution and to disregard the gloss which life has written upon
Striking the appropriate balance between fundamental
them.”447
constitutional principle and Americans’ lived experience remains the
Supreme Court’s most profound challenge.
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